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If we want to continue to enjoy our rivers—to swim in them, walk beside them, even 
drink their water—we have to adopt the nondual perspective.  We have to meditate on 
being the river so that we can experience within ourselves the fears and hopes of the 
river.  If we cannot feel the rivers, the mountains, the air, the animals, and other people 
from within their own perspective, the rivers will die and we will lose our chance for 
peace. 
 
        - Thich Nhat Hanh, Peace is Every Step 	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CHAPTER ONE	  
Introduction 
 
 On a brilliantly clear day in January 2013, the Yards Park on the Anacostia 
waterfront in Washington, D.C. is bustling with bikers and dog walkers, families playing 
touch football on the lawn and friends sitting at picnic tables, their faces turned towards 
the sun.  The river’s surface gleams in the sunlight, and sea gulls turn through the sky 
above it.  I have to squint when I look west past Nationals’ Park, the Frederick Douglass 
Memorial Bridge, Southeast Federal Center, and all the way out to the Masonic Temple 
in Virginia.  Behind me, the shoreline is lined with brick buildings—sanitation plants and 
old Naval factories built in a period when even industrial buildings were adorned with 
decorative masonry and ironwork.  While the O Street Pumping Facility still functions as 
a sewage treatment plant, most of the other riverfront plants have either been abandoned 
as vacant lots or turned into residential, office, or retail space.  What used to be a bustling 
industrial zone is quiet on this Sunday afternoon.  The legacy of those years of heavy 
industry, however, can still be found in the paved, artificial shoreline, the turbid water, 
and shallow, silted river bottom.  This legacy of abuse has left the Anacostia in a state of 
ecological stress, disrupting its ecosystem with a flood of pollutants and invasive species.  
The dock I stand on creaks as the river flows under it, green-brown water tossing old 
bottles and discarded plastic bags against the concrete sea wall.  But even after years of 
decline, there is an enduring beauty to the Anacostia: a persistent wildness that drifts past 
the pavement and smokestacks.  It is this beauty and wildness that continues to draw 
people to the river’s waterfront, so that even in its state of ecological insecurity, the 
Anacostia provides an urban people with access to nature in the inner city.   
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The view I see from the dock on this balmy January afternoon is the product of 
over two centuries of industrial activity, decades of urban decline, and numerous attempts 
at neighborhood revitalization by both private investors and Washington’s local 
government.  The story of this river’s decay operates within a complex narrative of 
environmental inequality and urban and environmental history.  This thesis will explore 
the intersections between these narratives and examine how the historical processes of 
plantation agriculture, military industrialization, and discriminatory zoning policies 
produced social and ecological inequalities in the Near Southeast neighborhood of 
Washington, D.C.      
The nation’s capital remains one of the most residentially segregated cities in the 
country, laid out with a north-south divide between the primarily white and African 
American regions of the city.  African Americans make up the largest representations of 
traditional minority groups in the District; therefore this thesis will focus on the social 
and environmental inequalities between the city’s white and black neighborhoods.  The 
District is divided into eight wards, which differ greatly in demographic layout.  A short 
car ride from one end of the city to the other reveals significant changes in the quality of 
living standards, reflecting a move from the majority white ward in the north of the city 
to the majority black wards in the south.  Washington is unique in that its population has 
historically been majority African American, earning it the nickname Chocolate City.  
Although it remains a majority African American city, housing in the District is 
segregated so that the best environmental quality is clustered away from the city’s 
African American neighborhoods.  Washington’s sole majority white ward boasts the 
best social services, cleanest water and air, and safest streets.   
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Figure	  1:	  A	  map	  of	  Washington,	  D.C.'s	  neighborhood	  wards.	  	  The	  Anacostia	  River	  runs	  east	  to	  west,	  
bordered	  by	  wards	  5	  and	  6	  on	  its	  north	  side	  and	  wards	  7	  and	  8	  on	  its	  south	  side.	  	  Source:	  
http://media.maps101.com/SUB/dom_cities/uWashDCWardI.gif.	   
According to 2010 census data, 35% of the District’s population is white, and 
mostly congregated in Wards 2 and 3 in the city’s Northwest region.1  In 2010 African 
Americans narrowly claimed a majority, comprising 50% of Washington’s population.2  
Most of the District’s Northeast, Southeast, and Southwest region, making up Wards 4, 5, 
6, 7, and 8, is occupied by Washington’s African American population.  Much of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “A Shrinking Majority,” Washington Post, March 25, 2011, accessed March 31, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/dc-census-2010/.  
2 Ibid.	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District’s industry remains concentrated in these majority African American regions; for 
example, Ward 6 is home to the Navy Yard, the O Street sewage treatment plant, and the 
D.C. Central Detention Facility, while Ward 7 houses the Benning Road garbage 
incinerator and the Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO) plant.  While the city has 
long been split along a black-white demographic, 2010 census data reported that 9% of 
the District’s population is Hispanic (mostly clustered in Ward 1 in Northwest), 3% is 
Asian, and 3% represents other ethnicities.3  The segregation of African American and 
white residents in the District is the result of complex causes including structural 
inequalities within both the federal and city government, as well as the decisions of 
private businesses to primarily cater to the District’s whitest population.  These actions 
have not only segregated the city, but have also caused its black majority to be 
disproportionately impacted by pollutants such as toxic air emissions and water 
contamination by relegating its African American residents to Washington’s most 
polluted and industrial region.  Within the District, it is clear that communities with 
safety, health, and stability are reserved for only a minority of the population. 
Near Southeast is a neighborhood shaped by centuries of industrial activity at the 
Washington Navy Yard, as well as postwar highway construction, and recent attempts at 
redevelopment.  Part of the District’s “black belt,” the neighborhood has long had a 
majority African American population that has been disproportionately exposed to 
effluence from the neighborhood’s industries, and toxic pollution in the Anacostia River.4 
Industry developed in Near Southeast as a response to Washington’s growth as a city, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid. 
4 Brett Williams, “A River Runs Through Us,” American Anthropologist 103 (2001): 
419, accessed March 27, 2013, doi:10.2307/683474, 419. 
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expanding out from the Navy Yard along the already heavily utilized Anacostia River.  
Filled with smokestacks and noisy manufacturing plants, the Near Southeast waterfront 
quickly transformed into an unpleasant and unsanitary place to live.  As the city grew 
along racial lines, Near Southeast, with its undesirable environment, was relegated to 
minority and immigrant residents as the white working class moved across the river to 
Uniontown (now Anacostia), a rural suburb guarded by racial covenant.  The 
environmental justice concepts of NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) and PIBBY (place-in-
blacks’-backyard) are essential to understanding the establishment of industry along the 
Near Southeast waterfront.5  Using these principles, city officials located necessary but 
unsanitary and unsightly industries in disenfranchised communities that were far from the 
seat of power.   
In Near Southeast, environmental concerns over the industrial exploitation of the 
Southeast waterfront came to a head in the mid-1990s after independent environmental 
studies revealed the presence of dangerous toxic substances, such as heavy metals and 
PCBs, in river sediment and soil samples.  Local environmental activists partnered with 
leaders in the majority African American neighborhoods along the Anacostia waterfront 
to successfully pressure major polluters like the U.S. Navy to begin a process of 
meaningful river and waterfront cleanup, and adopt a policy of environmental 
sensitivity.6  As local and federal government and nonprofits and community 
organizations have prioritized the ecological restoration of the Anacostia, private 
investors have begun to see lucrative opportunities for waterfront development of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality 
(Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), 4. 
6 John R. Wennersten, Anacostia: The Death & Life of An American River (Baltimore: 
Chesapeake Book Company, 2008), 206.	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formerly industrial areas in and around the Navy Yard.  The District government has 
encouraged private investment as a source of redevelopment for Near Southeast, most 
notably by funding the construction of the Nationals Park, a Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) certified baseball stadium completed for the Washington 
Nationals in 2008.  In addition, the District partnered with the federal government and 
Forest City Enterprises to design a mixed-use waterfront development called The Yards, 
now under construction.  Today, the Southeast waterfront is a maze of construction sites 
for high-end lofts in repurposed warehouses, and new retail or office space boasting 
sustainable designs and a connection to the river.  
The concepts of environmental justice and urban political ecology inform my 
approach to understanding the complex set of social and ecological processes and 
relationships that are responsible for creating the Anacostia River and its Near Southeast 
waterfront as urban spaces.  Environmental justice scholarship focuses on the 
disproportionate impact, on low-income and minority communities, of issues including 
highway construction, gentrification, and water pollution—all of which are at play in 
Near Southeast.  An environmental justice perspective allows one to critically analyze the 
ways in which federal policies, local governments, and municipal zoning boards have 
created vast environmental inequalities between white and minority neighborhoods.  
Building on this analysis, urban political ecology further spotlights the political and 
sociological implications of structural inequalities and environmental policies.  Urban 
political ecologists such as Melissa Checker and Chris Hagerman, for example, focus on 
the ways in which ‘green’ redevelopment has subverted struggles for justice.  The lenses 
of environmental justice and urban political ecology provide critical tools for 
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understanding the federal and municipal policies that have shaped the Near Southeast 
neighborhood.  Scholarship in environmental justice and urban political ecology provides 
a language with which to critically examine the processes of industrialization, 
deindustrialization, and redevelopment in urban neighborhoods.  However, these fields 
are both relatively recent developments in academia, and are typically employed in the 
analysis of contemporary urban issues.  Neighborhoods such as Near Southeast, however, 
have maintained such a long and complex relationship with their environment that a 
historical approach is necessary to understand how concerns of social and environmental 
inequality developed over time.  Therefore, I will also be applying a focus in 
environmental history to analyze the changing relationship between humans and nature 
on and along the Anacostia River.  This approach examines the evolution of a place in the 
context of social and environmental events.  The Anacostia and its waterfront 
neighborhoods have had such a long legacy of human presence in and manipulation of 
nature that unpacking the historical relationship between people and nature in the District 
is critical to understanding the construction of Near Southeast as an urban place.   
This thesis will analyze how social and ecological inequalities have interacted 
throughout Washington, D.C.’s urban and environmental history to shape Near Southeast 
as an industrial and undesirable space.  After a literature review, I will begin with an 
examination of the role of urban rivers throughout American history, as well as the 
federal and economic forces that contributed to their collective demise.  Chapter Three 
will move into an analysis of the three components of my case study: the Anacostia 
River, the Washington Navy Yard, and the neighborhood of Near Southeast.  Considering 
the relationship between these spaces over time, I will examine how their links in the 
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broader urban ecological system were compounded by social and environmental 
inequalities.  Finally, Chapter Four will take a critical look at present efforts at 
redevelopment in Near Southeast.  In particular, I will examine the publicly funded 
construction of a new baseball stadium for the Washington Nationals, as well as the 
development of The Yards.  Through this analysis, I will explore the social and 
environmental effects of the changing narrative about the Anacostia and its waterfront.  
This new narrative, touted by both private developers and the District’s government, 
could potentially transform the neighborhood and the river into a tourist destination rather 
than an ecological entity.  Washington, D.C.’s society and environment has long been 
obscured by its reputation as a city of stately monuments and halls of power, and through 
my analysis I hope to highlight the struggle and resilience of a community that has carved 
out a space for itself along a forgotten river.   
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Figure	  2:	  Washington,	  D.C.'s	  African	  American	  population	  according	  to	  2010	  census	  data.	  	  Near	  Southeast	  
is	  outlined	  here	  in	  black.	  	  Map	  by	  author. 
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Figure	  3:	  Median	  household	  income	  in	  Washington,	  D.C.	  according	  to	  2010	  census	  data.	  	  Near	  Southeast	  
is	  outlined	  here	  in	  black.	  	  Map	  by	  author.	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The Environmental Justice Lens 
In the environmental justice movement, community activists and scholars have 
worked to create a place for minority communities within the broader environmental 
movement by unifying the language of civil rights and environmental protection.  
Sociologist and activist Robert Bullard pioneered scholarship on this subject, blending 
science, politics, sociology, and activism in a manner formerly unexplored by other 
scholars.  Whereas scholars in environmental studies traditionally focus on science and 
ecology, Bullard widens the lens to include communities and justice.  Scholars and 
activists in environmental justice adhere to a new definition of the environment as a place 
where people and communities “live, work, and play.”7  By linking environmental health 
to community health, the environmental justice movement seeks to simultaneously create 
equitable environments and communities.  The focus of environmental justice, then, is 
not just an examination of environmental destruction, but also community destruction and 
the covert channels within politics and economics that encourage these processes.  
Environmental justice scholarship focuses on the human and ecological impact of 
the production of place through race and difference.  This production builds off of 
historical processes of structural inequalities within American government and society. 
Bullard links causes of environmental inequalities with historical perceptions of race, and 
argues that structural inequalities within local and federal polices have created an urban 
environment where clean air, clean water, and safe streets are luxury commodities 
available only to the wealthiest neighborhoods.  “Historically, toxic dumping and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Robert J. Brulle and David N. Pellow, “Environmental Justice: Human Health and 
Environmental Inequalities,” Annual Review of Public Health 27 (2006): 110, accessed 
May 1, 2013, doi: 10.1146/annurev.publhealth.27.021405.102124. 
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location of locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) have followed the ‘path of least 
resistance,’ meaning black and poor communities have been disproportionately burdened 
with these types of externalities,” Bullard explains.8  Focusing on the structural and 
environmental inequalities that disproportionately expose low-income and minority 
communities to toxins and pollutants, the environmental justice movement unifies 
community protests and environmental activism.  
The environmental justice movement has been enormously successful in exposing 
the policies that maintain structural inequalities.  Before the movement exploded onto the 
national radar, Bullard writes, “[f]ew environmentalists realized the sociological 
implications of the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) phenomenon,” through which those in 
power protected their own communities from land use allocations for unpleasant but 
necessary infrastructure such as, landfills, factories, sewage treatment plants, or 
hazardous waste dumps. 9  Unnoticed by much of the broader public, NIMBY-ism made 
structural inequalities implicit within zoning boards and local and federal government.  
“Public officials and private industry have in many cases responded to the NIMBY 
phenomenon using the place-in-blacks’-backyard (PIBBY) principle,” Bullard argues.10  
Environmental justice activists first exposed the links between movements for social 
justice and the broader environmental movement.11  
While the Supreme Court eventually outlawed racial covenants in 1948, Bullard 
emphasizes how the process of municipal land-use zoning perpetuated the same goals as 
the legal clauses.  By placing value on certain spaces over others, municipal zoning has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Bullard, Dumping in Dixie, 3.  
9 Ibid., 4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.	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become a central tool and example of NIMBY-ism and links institutionalized racism to 
environmental inequality.  Bullard demonstrates that zoning boards do not always plan 
development logically, especially with regards to minority communities.  “Competition 
often results between special interest groups (i.e., racial and ethnic minorities, organized 
civic clubs, neighborhood associations, developers, environmentalists, etc.) for 
advantageous land use,” Bullard writes.12  Given this competition, disenfranchised 
groups, such as minority communities, are most likely to lose out.  Bullard argues, 
“exclusionary zoning, discriminatory housing practices by rental agents, brokers, and 
lending institutions, and disparate facility siting decisions have contributed to and 
maintained racially segregated residential areas of unequal quality.”13  Favoring more 
affluent and enfranchised communities, structural inequalities created by institutions such 
as zoning boards, local governments, and federal agencies, have exacerbated situations of 
massive environmental inequality in Washington, D.C. and other urban areas across the 
United States.   
 
Approaches in Urban Political Ecology 
Environmental justice movements to correct social and environmental inequalities 
are just one step in the process of creating equitable urban communities.  Even after 
successful campaigns for environmental equity, redevelopers seeking to capitalize off of 
the improved environment continue to threaten marginalized communities.  Scholarship 
in urban political ecology examines what happens to communities after LULUs have 
been mitigated.  Ironically, the threat of exploitation of minority neighborhoods often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 8. 
13 Ibid.	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becomes even more pronounced after these spaces become healthier, more desirable 
places in which to live.  Urban political ecologists such as Melissa Checker and Chris 
Hagerman explore the ways in which redevelopment of formerly derelict neighborhoods 
paves over community histories and can lead to displacement of the original community.  
An analysis in urban political ecology adds further depth to the ideas of structural 
inequality and institutionalized racism first exposed by environmental scholars. 
Scholar Melissa Checker examines how successful environmental justice battles 
to stop further highway construction or limit pollution have made formerly marginalized 
neighborhoods more desirable and encouraged developers to view them as prime targets 
for redevelopment.  Checker refers to the connections between environmental justice and 
redevelopment as “environmental gentrification,” which she defines as “the convergence 
of urban redevelopment, ecologically-minded initiatives and environmental justice 
activism in an era of advanced capitalism.”14  Focusing her study on the Harlem 
neighborhood of New York City, Checker examines how the gains of the community’s 
environmental justice movement created a healthier and safer community that ultimately 
made the neighborhood appealing to redevelopers.  “Materially, the efforts of 
environmental justice activists to improve their neighborhoods (i.e. the removal of 
environmental burdens and the installation of environmental benefits) now help those 
neighborhoods attract an influx of affluent residents,” Checker observes.15  The long-term 
effectiveness of environmental justice movements, then, is negligible in the face of 
profitable business expansions and real estate investments.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Melissa Checker, “Wiped Out By The ‘Greenwave’: Environmental Gentrification and 
the Paradoxical Politics of Urban Sustainability,” City & Society 23 (2011), 212, accessed 
October 23, 2012, doi: 10.1111/j.1548-744X.2011.01063.x. 
15 Checker, “Wiped Out By the ‘Greenwave,’” 212.   
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Checker warns that redevelopment’s popular new focus on sustainability and the 
re-incorporation of nature into new designs ultimately silences important themes of the 
neighborhoods’ historical narratives.  Redevelopment policies that emphasize 
sustainability, Checker argues, “eclipse the long-standing issue of unequally distributed 
environmental burdens (i.e. toxic waste facilities, bus depots, waste producing industries) 
in low income neighborhoods and communities of color.”16  The positive environmental 
effects of sustainable design and the abstract idea of community revitalization distract 
from the reality of housing displacement and deterioration of community resiliency.  
Elaborating on this notion, Checker writes,  
environmental gentrification operates through a discourse of sustainability 
which simultaneously describes a vision of ecologically and socially 
responsible urban planning, a “green” lifestyle which appeals to affluent, 
eco-conscious residents, and a technocratic, politically neutral approach to 
solving environmental problems.17    
 
Just as attempts at redevelopment through highway construction after World War II were 
presented as a technocratic and modern solution to urban decline, ‘green’ redevelopment 
has emerged as today’s technocratic panacea for ecological destruction and urban 
poverty.  The danger of ‘green’ redevelopment is that it hides its inequalities behind a 
language of environmental sensitivity and modernity.18  While community residents were 
very much a part of the environmental justice campaign to clean up Harlem, Checker 
writes that they have been largely excluded from the plans for its redevelopment.  “A 
rubric of sustainability then becomes part of a post-political project that sidelines 
questions of real political inclusion and justice in the name of technocratic, community-
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based deliberation,” Checker concludes.19  By imprinting a technocratic vision for a 
sustainable community upon a functioning, existing community, redevelopers can detract 
significantly from the equitable gains of the environmental justice movement. 
Scholar Chris Hagerman also studies how redevelopment subverts environmental 
justice.  Particularly focusing on sustainable design, Hagerman argues that the re-
inclusion of nature into formerly industrial spaces alters communities’ historical 
narratives by covering up deep-seeded issues of race and social justice.  Recent 
redevelopment trends have focused on sustainable design that incorporates the natural 
landscape back into urban space, as seen in Hagerman’s study of the North Macadam and 
River Districts in Portland, Oregon.  Especially in vogue for urban waterfront regions, 
this ‘green’ redevelopment works to unify urban and wild spaces by emphasizing 
waterfront ecology through an incorporation of nature into architectural design plans.  
Hagerman writes,  
The environmental restoration and economic redevelopment of waterfront 
industrial sites reflects not only a remediation of the legacies of industrial 
pollution, but also an attempt to replace legacies of social conflict and 
labour unrest, through a focus on imaginaries of post-industrial 
economies, ecologies and urban citizenship.20 
 
Just as highway construction cloaked slum clearing in a language of modernism and 
efficiency, ‘green’ redevelopment masks its subversion of community histories behind 
the appealing language of environmental sustainability.21  Referencing the current 
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transitioning of industrial waterfronts, Hagerman describes “a shifting of spatial priorities 
by urban governance regimes, from a history of containing the urban poor and industrial 
uses to dispersing them in favour of destination-oriented retail and residential areas 
imagined as post-industrial or ‘creative’ economic spaces.”22  As factories morph into 
high-end lofts and warehouses are leveled into parkland, the history embodied in these 
spaces is hidden under a façade of redevelopment.  By subverting certain historical 
narratives, redevelopment is another tool through which environmental inequalities are 
reinforced by social inequalities and perhaps vice versa.23   
While renewed interest in ecological health is certainly welcomed, Hagerman 
cautions that this interest should be closely examined so that it is not used to conceal 
other goals.  The use of nature glosses over industrial legacies by hiding their negative 
impact under a progressive language of sustainability.24  Heavy industrial use and years 
of neglect in these regions have destroyed the ecosystems of many urban waterfronts.  
“The ecological restoration and environmental rhetoric of livability bestows elements of 
‘authenticity’ on developments while allaying fears of the loss of ‘nature’ and 
‘community’ in the post-industrial world,” Hagerman writes.25  The re-inclusion of nature 
into these formerly industrial spaces, then, is a two-sided coin where urban and wild 
spaces are unified on one side, while regional social justice issues are obscured on the 
other. 
Much of the fanfare around the Navy Yard’s redevelopment in Washington, D.C. 
focuses on the reincorporation of nature into the built environment.  One of the most 	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publicized developments along the Southeast waterfront is The Yards, a mixed-use 
complex built on the grounds of the old Naval Gun Factory.26  Here, the developers hope 
to create a community in which waterfront recreation is a major attraction: the Yards Park 
has already been completed, and a public marina is also slated for construction.27  
Environmental sensitivity has been incorporated into the redevelopment project, as the 
sidewalks are lined with bioretention planters to diminish storm water runoff, the Yards 
Park includes plantings of native species, and most new developments promise to be 
LEED certified.  Frequently promoting their many riverfront views, developments like 
The Yards are directly invested in supporting ecological restoration to make its 
waterfront a healthy and desirable place to live.  Contemporary redevelopment represents 
a shift in value around the neighborhood’s waterfront land.  Since people first inhabited 
the Anacostia watershed region, its human residents have shaped the river to reflect the 
values of the watershed’s dominant class.  The social and ecological changes that created 
Near Southeast as a place played out over a period of more than two centuries; therefore, 
a historical perspective is a necessary addition to the lenses of environmental justice and 
urban political ecology.   
 
Perspectives in Environmental History 
 Environmental history teases apart the complex relationships between humans 
and nature responsible for creating landscapes, such as the Anacostia River and its 
waterfront, over extended periods of time.  Of particular concern for environmental 
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historians is the artificial construction of space, whether it is called city or wilderness.  
Scholars such as William Cronon and Matthew Klingle have studied the demarcation of 
rural and urban space in places including, Chicago, Illinois, Seattle, Washington, and 
colonial and post-colonial New England.  A historical perspective enables scholars to 
follow the arc of ecological change over time, and provides an insight to the man-made 
divide between natural and urban space.         
Washington is a city held together by two rivers, yet its historical relationship 
with its natural environment has been anything but peaceful.  I will use the lens of 
environmental history throughout this thesis to examine how ecological processes have 
changed over the course of history as a result of both human and natural forces.  Cronon 
writes, “The great strength of ecological analysis in writing history is its ability to 
uncover processes and long-term changes which might otherwise remain invisible.”28  
Using the Anacostia’s ecology as an entry point into the District’s urban history, I will 
demonstrate how its environmental transformation follows the city’s path of 
industrialization and population growth. 
Apart from its inclusion of ecology within the historical narrative, environmental 
history also facilitates a specific focus on place.  Klingle describes his environmental 
history of Seattle as “an ethic of place,” which explains the creation of a city as a physical 
and conceptualized space.29  Urban histories often exclude a discussion of nature from 
their chronicles of cities, and this exacerbates the popular notion that nature cannot exist 
in urban spaces.  As Klingle writes, “[F]ew historians consider the role that nature has 	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played in forging the places urbanites call home, or how it has been an instrument to 
define and enforce the idea of community.”30  Environmental history, however, provides 
an opportunity to shed light on the wildness within urban communities. 
Traditionally, scholars in environmental history have focused their studies 
exclusively on a place’s ecological transformation.  While human actors come in and out 
of the ecological narrative, they are rarely the primary subjects.  However, the human 
dimension is necessary to present a fully ecological history of place.  The Nacotchtank 
Indians built the first communities along the Anacostia and began a long history of 
human occupation that braided man-made and natural systems into a shared ecology.  My 
thesis will put human subjects and social processes at the forefront of an environmental 
narrative, examining the role of people and societies as catalysts for ecological change on 
the Anacostia.   
 
Conclusion 
The lenses of environmental justice, urban political ecology, and environmental 
history provide the foundation for a multi-faceted analysis of the changing relationships 
between people and their environment along the Anacostia River.  In this thesis I will 
examine in particular the social and ecological forces that have inspired land use changes 
in the waterfront neighborhood of Near Southeast.  A long history of industrialization and 
urban decline altered the neighborhood’s identity over time, but also allowed for an 
ongoing revision of its social and economic value that continues today in Near 
Southeast’s redevelopment.  Social issues, including racial segregation in city housing 
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and NIMBY-ism on the District’s zoning board, exacerbated the Anacostia’s ecological 
problems such as erosion caused by intense agricultural activity and water pollution from 
municipal and industrial waste.  In a pattern that was repeated in waterfront cities across 
the country, the simultaneous decline of both Near Southeast and the Anacostia River 
resulted from both social and ecological forces.  Over a more than two centuries, urban 
social issues and environmental destruction along the Anacostia transformed the river’s 
waterfront neighborhoods into forgotten swaths of pollution and poverty in the District’s 
inner city.  The following chapter will examine the historical role public entities, such as 
the federal government, and private entities, such as heavy industry, have had in the 
decline of urban rivers and waterfronts across the country.         
 
 
 
 
 
	   26	  
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Industry, the Federal Government, and the Making of Urban Rivers  
 
The Anacostia River’s banks along Anacostia Park are shady, and muddy.  They 
are lined with riprap and trees, rather than native wetlands, and strewn with garbage in 
every form imaginable.  Plastic water bottles and empty bags of junk food, used diapers 
and condoms, hypodermic needles and stray socks—anything littered on the street or 
flushed down a toilet can make its way into the Anacostia.  Sometimes encampments are 
left along the riverbank, nestled into bushes or tucked under bridges, abandoned by 
people who went to the river to be left alone.  Walking through this debris is like taking a 
tour of the city’s trash cans: what would normally lie hidden in garbage trucks or burned 
in trash incinerators is laid out in the open along the riverbank.  The river carries this 
refuse with it as it moves slowly through Washington’s inner city, so that the stories of an 
urban people are blended into its currents and buried in its sediment.   
As is the case for so many urban rivers, people shaped the Anacostia, but the river 
also shaped the people.  While the river’s ecology has been decimated by human 
manipulation, a process that began with plantation agriculture and continued with modern 
channelization, it has also inspired the persistence of riverfront communities who identify 
as boaters, anglers, or recreators.  One of these communities is the Seafarers Yacht Club, 
which was founded on the Anacostia in 1965, when segregation made it impossible for 
the black boaters of the river’s waterfront neighborhoods to join some of the District’s 
established white boating clubs.31  In a city that is still deeply segregated, the Seafarers 
Yacht Club provides activity and association for boaters who have lived along the river 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 DeNeen Brown, “The Yachtsman,” Washington Post Magazine, October 2, 2011, 19. 
	   27	  
for years.  For Club co-founder Charles Martin, his yacht is “a testament to the story of a 
boy who, because of his color, could not rent a boat” on the Anacostia during his 
childhood in the 1940s.32  For over fifty years, boaters like Martin have preserved a 
history of maritime culture on the Anacostia, despite the obstacles of racial segregation 
and environmental degradation.  Besides boaters, anglers also have a prominent presence 
on the river.  Most of these fishermen are African American or Latino, and many of them 
are immigrants from Latin America.33  Despite the dangers of ingesting fish from the 
Anacostia’s polluted waters, these anglers persist.  As the Washington Post Magazine 
wrote in 2011, “More than compensating for any risk is the magic of a Sunday afternoon 
on the bank of even a dirty river.  While Mexican rancheras stream over a smartphone, 
[anglers] fish and joke, talk about work, talk about home.”34  For many of these 
fishermen, the Anacostia provides a link between past and present, as well as an outlet for 
both nostalgia and stress.  Although the Anacostia attracts few recreators from other parts 
of the District, it has served as a touchstone for waterfront residents who preserve cultural 
traditions and pastimes on its waters.  Anglers, boaters, and recreators have been the 
primary actors in the river’s restoration, as they have demonstrated the Anacostia’s 
enduring value.  However, it can be hard for people without an emotional connection to 
the river to understand the significance of its trashed and turbid waters.   
The Anacostia’s transformation from resilient ecosystem to struggling, polluted 
river follows the path of so many American waterways whose ecology was sacrificed in 
the name of utilitarian values.  These values were first championed by early foresters of 	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the nineteenth century who sought to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people, and emphasized efficient resource extraction above all else.  Industry and the 
federal government acted as mutually reinforcing powers that redefined waterways in 
terms of functionality and reshaped rivers to meet the needs of a population that was 
rapidly growing and urbanizing.  The following chapter will describe the national pattern 
of exploitation and mechanization of American waterways that caused the widespread 
decline of urban rivers such as the Anacostia.  The chapter begins with an examination of 
the economic and social forces, including industrialization and population expansion, 
which created modern metropolises.  Next I will move into a discussion of federal 
agencies, such as the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, and their 
role in rerouting and repurposing waterways across the country for the sake of 
navigability and flood control.  As American cities became more established along 
waterfronts, they depended on agencies like the Corp to induce distance between rivers 
and cities that would protect urban developments from natural phenomenon such as 
floods and tidal fluctuations.  Both industry and the federal government shared a 
utilitarian vision for American waterways that resulted in mechanized and urbanized 
rivers including the Anacostia, Androscoggin, Passaic, and Los Angeles.  
 
Urbanizing Rivers: Industry and America’s Waterways 
Many Eastern cities grew out of colonial port towns that were founded because of 
their access to deep water where trading or military ships could dock.  Indeed, almost as 
soon as Europeans landed on American soil, this country’s rivers were reassigned a 
distinctly economic purpose.  The main means of trade transport until the rise of the 
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railroad, rivers ran mills throughout colonial and post-colonial New England and they 
fueled factories up and down the Eastern seaboard after the Industrial Revolution.  The 
redefinition of rivers as economic—rather than ecological—bodies was encouraged by 
early readings of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which entrusted 
authority over navigable waterways to the federal government.  As these waterways were 
valued for their importance in transporting trade goods, they were considered tools of 
interstate commerce and therefore subject to federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause.  In 1824, Congress furthered the federal government’s power over navigable 
waterways by passing the Rivers and Harbors Act, which provided the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers with considerable funds to straighten and dredge American rivers in order to 
free up interstate trade routes.  Throughout much of the country’s early history, rivers not 
only powered industry but also facilitated trade, and because of this role they were 
exploited and redefined by both industry and the federal government.  
The industrialization of Eastern cities’ waterfronts during the early twentieth 
century created the modern phenomenon that is an urban river.  As historian Martin V. 
Melosi writes, factories “were often constructed near water courses, since water was 
needed for steam boilers or for other processes.  Waterways also provided the least 
expensive means of disposing of soluble or suspendable wastes such as phenol, benzene, 
toluene, arsenic, and naphtha.”35  As politicians redefined rivers for their importance to 
trade, captains of industry valued rivers for their functional importance in providing both 
a fuel and a dumping ground.  In many Eastern cities, factories replaced wetlands and 
pollution fouled the quality of countless waterways so that the ecology of urban rivers 	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quickly deteriorated in the process of resource extraction and transportation.  Rivers 
became a kind of extension of the American factory as industrial plants sprawled across 
their waterfronts and polluted waterways.   
The use of rivers changed from agriculture and commercial purposes to heavy 
industry, as their waterfronts industrialized.  While modern factories produced valuable 
consumer items, the spaces in which they produced these items were devalued by the 
pollution, waste, and noise that factories emitted.  American cities became increasingly 
undesirable places to live as factories sprang up along urban waterfronts and cities’ 
populations exploded with laborers seeking manufacturing jobs.  Indeed, Melosi argues 
that the rise of the industrial city was uniquely responsible for marking urban space as 
undesirable.  He writes,   
The presence of a factory often meant the deterioration of the surrounding 
areas.  Factories usually adopted the simplest—not the most sanitary—
disposal methods for garbage, slag, ashes, and scrap metals.  Meatpacking, 
which concentrated in cities such as Chicago and St. Louis, inundated 
adjacent areas with foul smells and dumped animal wastes on vacant lots.  
Tanneries contributed more pollution by washing hides in nearby water 
sources.36         
 
The air, water, and noise pollution emitted by factories created isolated industrial zones 
within cities that were quickly forgotten by wealthier residents.37  Highly industrialized 
waterfronts became the most unattractive feature of every modern city, and were usually 
occupied by the urban poor.38   
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The population explosions in American cities during the early twentieth century 
resulted in pockets of poverty in the industrial centers of most cities.39  “Many workers 
had little choice but to live in the least desirable sections of the city, usually close to the 
factories where they worked or near marshy bogs and stagnant pools,” Melosi writes.40  
The hasty expansion of local residences into overpopulated slums compounded the 
difficulties already accrued by nearby factories’ air and water pollution, so that 
established sanitation and environmental services were inadequate.41  The creation of 
urban industrial space solidified the demarcation of urban space along racial and 
economic lines, crowding devalued people on devalued land.42   
Lewiston, Maine typified the process of industrialization of urban rivers and 
waterfronts.  Starting in 1888, pulp and paper mills sprang up along Lewiston’s 
waterfront.  These mills were incredibly productive; however, the effluence they 
routinely dumped into the Androscoggin River quickly destroyed the viability of the river 
as a municipal water supply. 43  Scholar Wallace Scot McFarlane writes, “Not only did 
the manufacturing of wood pulp contribute to pollution entering the Androscoggin, the 
logging necessary to provide the wood for pulp mills also contributed to deforestation 
and sediment entering the river.”44  The exploitation of the surrounding resources as well 
as the industrialization of Lewiston’s waterfront set off a dramatic destruction of the 
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Androscoggin’s ecology.  Between 1888 and 1927, industry built twenty-one dams 
outside of towns along the Androscoggin River to serve waterfront factories.45   
As the river was mechanized, its waterfront was transformed into a stretch of 
heavy industry.  “Attracting thousands of French Canadian immigrants, the new 
industries changed the social makeup of the Androscoggin’s largest urban center, the 
twin towns of Lewiston and Auburn, and brought new problems of filth and crowding,” 
McFarlane writes.46  These new residents were impacted by the river’s ecological decline, 
as industrial and municipal pollution contaminated the river and further disrupted its 
ecology.47  The river became an almost entirely industrial entity: water quality worsened 
dangerously, the surface was spread with foam, wildlife died out, and the city was 
permeated with the river’s horrible smell.48   
More than anything, the stench drove residents to action, and by the 1940s the 
town began a plan to remediate the Androscoggin’s pollution.49  However, the pulp and 
paper mills were the largest industries in Lewiston’s (and Maine’s) economy, and city 
officials worried that less waterfront industry would send the state into economic 
depression.50  “Rather than regulate the pollution directly, the state legislature decided to 
call for more research before taking action,” McFarlane explains.51  Economic 
dependency on waterfront industry inspired a more lenient approach to environmental 
regulation that was only dismantled once the Androscoggin River Technical Committee 
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(ARTC) gave chemist Walter A. Lawrence sole authority over the river’s ecological 
remediation.52  The widespread damming of the Androscoggin River, early 
industrialization of the Lewiston waterfront, rapid water pollution, and ongoing process 
of ecological remediation demonstrate the far-reaching effect of industrialization on both 
rivers and their waterfronts.  
As demonstrated in Lewiston, much of the waste produced by waterfront factories 
and residents ended up in the nearby waterways, so that urban rivers became an extension 
not only of industry but also of the entire industrialized city.  Not long after industry took 
root in urban centers, waterways up and down the East Coast were already being left for 
dead by cities that could no longer rely on them as water supplies.  New Jersey’s Passaic 
River followed a similar path of decline as Maine’s Androscoggin River.  Heavy industry 
on Newark’s Passaic waterfront included factories producing dyes, paints, textiles, and 
pesticides, as well as manufacturing facilities for leather tanning and metalworking.53  As 
was the case in Lewiston, Newark’s factories also dumped their effluence directly into 
the river, so that the Passaic’s ecology rapidly deteriorated.54  By the late 1800s, the 
Passaic could no longer provide the city with clean water, and Newark was forced to 
search for a new water supply.55  Across the country, urban rivers served as the sinks to 
the industries’ faucets.  However, the danger of this approach was made clear when cities 
like Newark lost their local waters supply.  As Jenny Price writes about the Los Angeles 	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River, “[w]hen you use and change a landscape, then the place will respond.  Nature is 
never passive.”56  After only a few decades of industrialization, rivers such as the Passaic 
in New Jersey, were poisoned and left for dead, and by the 1960s, others, like the 
Cuyahoga in Ohio, were catching fire.   
Environmental activists in the 1960s and 1970s seized on the dramatic image of 
burning water, and pushed for comprehensive remediation of water pollution, however 
little attention was given to the declining communities who lived along these rivers.  
Water pollution was only part of the problem, as the industrial utilization of rivers was 
enabled not only by the deregulation of industry but also by the Army Corps of 
Engineer’s mechanization of waterways.  For centuries, Americans fixated on taming 
waterways to allow for the their industrial exploitation that only became national news 
when rivers burned.  Not until the late 1980s did Congress seriously question the near 
limitless authority the Army Corps of Engineers had exercised over American waterways 
for over two centuries.     
     
Flood Control and Navigability: The Federal Government’s Transformation of 
American Waterways 
 
As technology advanced, the relationship between the industrialization of both 
cities and rivers became even more pronounced and followed the path of western 
expansion and the Industrial Revolution.  Throughout the country, rivers, such as the 
Androscoggin or Passaic, were heavily exploited as municipal water supplies, industrial 
dumping grounds, and power generators for rural regions.  Industry and federal agencies 	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such as the Army Corps of Engineers placed such an intense utilitarian value on 
American waterways that they appeared tame: the American economy’s beasts of burden.  
However, events such as the Los Angeles River’s immense floods of 1914 and 1938 
reminded exploiters of waterways that, deep down, these rivers were wild things, 
controlled not by economics but by Mother Nature.   
No single organization is more responsible for subduing America’s rivers than the 
Army Corps of Engineers.  A branch of the U.S. Army, the Corps is almost as old as the 
country itself, and was originally established in 1779 to construct military forts and 
buildings.  However, its responsibilities expanded in 1824 when the General Survey Act 
gave the Corps purview over the maintaining the navigability of the nation’s roads and 
waterways.  In a report released in 2000, Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS) and the 
National Wildlife Federation (NWF) wrote that, for two centuries, the Corps devoted 
itself to “building and deepening more than 140 ports and harbors, constructing the 
nation’s 11,000-mile network of inland waterway navigation channels, 8,500 miles of 
levees and floodwalls, and more than 500 flood control dams.”57  Employing the newest 
technologies and designing immense public works projects, the Corps reigned supreme 
during the technocratic age of the 1930s to 1950s.58  “It did not take long for both [the 
Corps] and the Congress to realize that some form of Corps project, paid for by the 
taxpayers of America, could generate a lot of votes and contributions for a legislator’s 	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next campaign,” scholar Daniel McCool explains.59  Congressmen, then, threw their 
support behind the Corps, essentially giving them a blank check with which to build 
dams and channels on waterways throughout the country.  
It is no coincidence that the Corps’ heyday corresponded with American society’s 
reliance on modern technology for solutions to problems such as economic recession and 
massive unemployment.  At the end of World War II, the Corps’ projects benefited from 
and represented the military-industrial economy responsible for pulling the country out of 
the Great Depression.  As public works projects, the Corps plans were daring and 
impressive, providing resources and job opportunities to a nation in need.  Despite the 
benefits of the Corps’ technocratic approach, the bureaucracy and sheer enormity of its 
projects often hindered their effectiveness.  “The projects were sometimes in the national 
interest, occasionally in accord with sound economic principles, but rarely built in an 
environmentally sensitive manner, and sometimes a gross waste of money,” McCool 
writes.60  However, immense public trust in and overall demand for the Corps’ projects 
allowed them to drastically alter the character of American waterways in a very short 
period of time.   
The Los Angeles River is one of the most poignant examples of urban industry 
and federal agencies’ impact on waterfront ecology.  Before it was manipulated by man, 
the river swelled and dried as winter turned to summer.61  However its expansion from 
winter rains became seen as flooding once development moved into the river’s flexible 
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channel.62  After the First Transcontinental Railroad connected Los Angeles to the East 
Coast in 1869, the city’s population boomed as droves of Easterners followed the 
uniquely American urge to go west.  In compliment to a growing population, industry 
expanded along the Los Angeles River.  “Railroad tracks and freight yards lined both 
banks.  Warehouses and manufacturing plants were built nearby,” Blake Gumprecht 
writes in a description of this period of expansion along the Los Angeles River.63  The 
presence of railroads and the constant threat of flooding made waterfront land along the 
Los Angeles River suitable for few other ventures besides industry, and soon the river’s 
banks were overflowing with industrial plants and warehouses.64  As the city’s built 
environment expanded, almost everything that was excluded from the idealized image of 
Los Angeles as a modern western city started making its way into the river, including 
effluence such as industrial waste, garbage, and sewage.  Even people, migrants and 
down-and-outers from all over the map, found a home in the river’s channel.65  
Gumprecht writes, “Not only was the river lined with industry, it became an industrial 
site itself, a use that remains prevalent today.”66  Gradually, the Los Angeles River 
completed its transformation into an urban river, and its use changed from agricultural 
irrigation to municipal water source to urban dumping ground, until “it was as much 
deplored as it was ignored.” 67  Constantly viewed in terms of the resources it offered, the 
river ceased to exist for ecological purposes and instead was manipulated to serve the 
needs of a booming metropolis.   	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The region’s growing built environment meant that the Los Angeles River’s 
natural floods caused considerably more damage during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries than they had ever previously caused.68  As landscape architect David 
Fletcher explains, “[T]he river did not exist in the summers.  Its flow was seasonal, dry in 
the summer and flooded during winter storms…Such extremes inspired settlers to view 
the river as a violent flood machine, something to be restrained.”69  Industries’ intense 
dependence on these rivers led to a fear of their unpredictability, which was ultimately 
solved by the mechanization and control of these waterways through modern 
technologies including dams, locks, and channels.  These tools have completely 
transformed the behavior and appearance of America’s rivers so that mechanized 
waterways serve the economy but lose their ecological integrity.  Arguments for flood 
control first surfaced after the flood of 1914, and additional damaging floods in 1926 and 
1938 garnered further support for a series of expensive flood control projects.  County 
engineers, and later the Army Corps of Engineers, devised an enormous flood control 
system that replaced the Los Angeles River’s natural ecosystem with concrete channels 
and dams.  
In the case of the Los Angeles River, the region, Congress, and President Franklin 
Roosevelt gave the Corps such strong support that there was little opposition to its 
transformation of the watershed.  Much of this change occurred during the Great 
Depression, and the Corps’ elaborate projects throughout Los Angeles and the Inland 
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Valley provided ample job opportunities for a region struggling with unemployment.70  
Essentially unchallenged by the citizens and the federal government, the Corps eventually 
devised a $106.8 million-dollar plan in which the entire Los Angeles River watershed 
would be transformed and almost completely covered in concrete.71  What once was a 
fluctuating river that carried snowmelt through a dry valley and into the Pacific Ocean 
became a mechanized work of man, where concrete channels, reservoirs, and dams 
replaced natural washes and canyons.  Fletcher observes,  
The present day river functions mainly as a flood control system 
consisting of tributary debris basins that capture sediment from the 
mountains, dams and reservoirs that regulate and detain water, and a 
concrete riverbed engineered to conduct water to the ocean as quickly as 
possible.72   
 
The river’s course has been straightened so that eighty-two percent of its length is now a 
paved channel.73  Covering it in concrete and streamlining it into a highway, the Corps 
recreated the Los Angeles River in the image of the metropolis it runs through.  As 
Fletcher writes, the river today “is an infrastructural ecology, opportunistic and emergent, 
one that lives off human excess, with many of its values and functions misunderstood.”74  
Indeed, Fletcher argues that contemporary Los Angeles River can only be explained in 
terms of “freakology” rather than ecology because manipulation by the Corps, industry, 
and residents has created an environment devoid of natural ecology.75  The Los Angeles 
River’s long history of exploitation and manipulation has left the region struggling to 
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come to terms with the utilitarian and ecological values of a river buried under reinforced 
concrete.                           
Projects like the paving of the Los Angeles River occurred on waterways across 
the country: the Mississippi was channelized in the early 1900s, the Columbia River was 
locked and dammed in the 1930s, the Kissimmee River was straightened in the 1960s, 
and the list goes on.  The extent of human influence over American waterways is so far-
reaching that, the Census Bureau reports, “85 percent of the inland water surface in the 
United States is artificially controlled.”76  Whether dammed up, diverted into reservoirs, 
or straightened into channels, American waterways are far from the meandering rivers, 
vibrant wetlands, and resilient estuaries they once were.  McCool refers to the act of 
conquering these waterways as “water hubris,” a philosophy that drove the Corps for the 
better parts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.77  By McCool’s definition, this 
philosophy relies on the assumption that rivers serve a purely functional purpose and 
humans are destined to control them.78  With this philosophy in mind, the Corps set about 
transforming both access to water and the conceptualization of waterways in the United 
States.   
The Bureau of Reclamation joined the Corps as part of a larger history of 
utilitarianism that has goaded environmentalists since preservationists first sparred with 
conservationists in the early twentieth century.  Created in 1902, the Bureau is a federal 
agency charged exclusively with managing water in the American west.  Like the Corps, 
the Bureau has focused on the resource value—rather than ecology—of American 
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waterways, seeking to efficiently exploit western rivers to provide power and water to the 
greatest number by building dams and reservoirs.  Government agencies such as the 
Corps and the Bureau “acted as though only benefits, free of costs, could be obtained by 
replacing nature with edifice.”79  This technocratic approach was typical of much of the 
twentieth century, an age that began with progressivism and ended with military-
industrialism.  However, implicit within this approach was a dangerous, utilitarian 
conceptualization of nature.  As TCS and NWF reported in 2000, “Although many of 
these projects have been critical to the nation’s economic development, numerous Corps 
projects have demonstrated an overreaching will to control nature, and a naïve belief that 
engineering has the capacity to fundamentally replumb and reshape the nation’s rivers, 
floodplains, and coastlines.”80  Through agencies such as the Corps and the Bureau, the 
federal government was in the business of extracting the most resources out of its rivers 
as possible.  As McCool writes, “[A] motto for the Bureau of Reclamation…[was] ‘Our 
rivers: total use for greater wealth.’”81  Heeding the Bureau’s motto, government 
engineers conquered America’s waterways without considering that their utilitarian, 
technocratic solutions might be ecologically damaging. 
In Los Angeles, the Corps’s efforts at flood control on the Los Angeles River 
replaced the region’s ecosystem with concrete channels that allowed the city to sprawl, 
unchecked, into the nearby valleys.  Nature writer Jenny Price explores the result of the 
city’s unique relationship to nature and determines, “[T]his is the reigning story we tell 
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about L.A.: There is no nature here.”82  One of the Corps’ most ambitious and 
technologically sophisticated projects, the paving of the Los Angeles River completely 
transformed the city’s natural environment.  With so many arroyos and canyons filled and 
covered with concrete, and so much wildlife lost to the mountains and desert, Price has to 
redefine the traditional idea of nature in order to locate it in her city.  She writes of the 
Corps’ transformation of the Los Angeles River,  
They recategorized it as infrastructure, with the freeways and electrical 
grid. To the public, in any case, the channel no longer looked wild enough 
to be a river or to count as nature at all. And this is how L.A. lost its 
river—not lost as in no longer had one, since L.A. actually still had it, but 
lost as in could no longer see or find it.83 
 
The Corps robbed Los Angeles of a connection to the wildness that once flowed through 
its city, so that many of its residents believe they live in a landscape devoid of nature.  In 
this way, the Corps’ mechanization of the Los Angeles River transformed the city’s 
understanding of its own environment and identity.  “Angelenos reimagined the river as 
nonexistent, and banished it from their collective imagination of history and place,” Price 
writes.84  The Corps’ extensive flood control projects on the Los Angeles River replaced 
ecosystems with industrial and economic systems that perpetuated urban expansion but 
severed the region’s connection to its natural environment.     
 
Forging a New Water Ethic 
By the late 1980s, public trust in the Corps’ judgment had reached a tipping point.  
Massive water projects, once praised for their innovation and modernism, were 
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scrutinized for their inefficiencies and labeled a misuse of taxpayer money.85  One of the 
most notable criticisms of the Corps came out of the TCS and NWF report in 2000 that 
investigated wasteful spending and environmental harm in Corps projects.  In their report, 
the groups determined, “Countless ecosystems and billions of dollars continue to be 
wasted in the continuation of traditional Corps policies and programs, which often fall 
short of their objectives and too often disregard fundamental fiscal and environmental 
responsibilities.”86  Of particular concern to both TCS and NWF was Congress’s 
unchecked spending for on-going environmentally damaging projects including the 
Eastern Arkansas Irrigation projects, the deepening of the Delaware River, and the Upper 
Mississippi Lock Expansions.87  McCool writes that, during their most influential years, 
the Corps “allied with Congress and beneficiary groups into an ‘iron triangle’ of special-
interest politics…[and] literally changed the face of riverine America.”88  As TCS and 
NWF attest, special interest groups, such as developers and contractors, have historically 
had a great deal of influence over the Corps’ projects.89  However, legislative support for 
the Corps’ public works projects was so strong that it took over a century for anyone to 
seriously question the agency’s approach, and by that time almost every American river 
had been mechanized.   
With the passage of the 1986 Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), 
Congress finally demanded a change.90  Advocates for the environment and limited 
government spending pushed the bill through Congress, but had to make significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 McCool, River Republic, 31. 
86 Conrad et. al., Troubled Waters, 3. 
87 Ibid., 1, 3. 
88 McCool, River Republic, 28. 
89 Conrad et. al., Troubled Waters, 4. 
90 McCool, River Republic, 31. 
	   44	  
concessions to garner the needed votes.91  While these concessions included funding for 
377 new Corps projects, the achievements came when “Congress agreed to a significant 
cost-sharing proviso—making special interests pay at least something for their benefits, 
and requiring the Corps to do fish and wildlife mitigation simultaneously with project 
construction.”92  Though this achievement was not a complete success, it nevertheless 
began the process of reigning in the Corps from the all-powerful technocratic agency it 
had matured into since the 1930s.  TCS and NWF point out that the Corps found its new 
role confusing as federal politics didn’t always reflect the environmentalist zeal that 
inspired a revision of the agency’s mandate.93  After 1986, McCool writes, “the Corps 
began a new life as a schizophrenic agency, tearing up rivers with one hand while 
restoring and preserving rivers with the other.”94  Under this new approach, many 
projects that were built to last for centuries are now being reassessed.95  However, TCS 
and NWF argue, “A gap remains…between the Corps’ purported commitment to 
environmental and fiscal responsibility and the reality of Corps projects.”96  Once again, 
the Corps is leading the charge in a new field, using modern science and technology to 
address a man-made problem, and launching enormous ecological restoration projects. 97    
Today, the Corps’ early projects and industry’s former waste disposal practices 
are generally regarded as irresponsible and shortsighted.  Although the Corps has adopted 
new methods and approaches that focus on ecological restoration and demand meaningful 
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environmental impact studies, little has been done to remediate the impact that the history 
of mechanization and industrialization has had on urban society.  The Corps has not yet 
officially connected the destruction of urban rivers with the destruction of waterfront 
neighborhoods, and so these places remain ignored—if not forgotten.  A new approach to 
correcting past environmentally catastrophic projects must remediate both the social and 
ecological effects of the federal government and industry’s manipulation of American 
waterways.  These social and ecological effects are demonstrated by the decline of the 
Near Southeast neighborhood along the Anacostia waterfront in Washington, D.C.  
There, the river still serves a purpose for navigation and limited recreation, however its 
ecology has been deeply altered by a long history of waterfront industry and 
manipulation by the Army Corps of Engineers.  National issues of urbanization, 
industrialization, and mechanization have played out on the small scale along the 
Anacostia River for well over two centuries.      
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A Case Study on the Anacostia: The River, The Washington Navy Yard, and  
Near Southeast 
 
If you’re willing to put on chest waders and waddle through the Anacostia’s silt at 
low tide, if you’re patient enough to fall a few times and steady yourself with muddy 
hands, and imaginative enough to squint just so at the river’s turbid water, then you might 
catch a glimpse of what the river once was.  Many Washingtonians think the Anacostia is 
too polluted to ever resemble the impressive, translucent river it once was, but after 
spending four months working on ecological restoration projects on the river, I’ve 
experienced enough of these glimpses of historical clarity to fill me with a deep 
appreciation of the Anacostia’s enduring value and beauty.   
Early one morning in July 2012, I went to the Langston Golf Course and Driving 
Range in Northeast Washington, D.C. to work on an ecological restoration project with 
the Anacostia Watershed Society (AWS) and the National Capital Parks-East division of 
the National Park Service (NPS).  For decades, the two organizations have worked to 
rehabilitate the Anacostia’s anemic ecosystem, and that morning our task was to install 
meshed metal fences throughout the river’s tidal areas around Kingman Lake, so that 
young native plants could establish themselves without being eaten by the region’s 
exploding population of non-native, resident Canada geese.  My fellow AWS interns and 
I worked with the AWS staff conservation biologist and an NPS ranger and her interns to 
haul heavy rolls of metal fencing through the mud, measure out rectangular grids, and 
hammer iron supporting rods deep into the thick sediment until we established a 
patchwork of goose fences throughout the silty shoreline that once comprised a vibrant 
wetland.   
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Above the squelching, panting, and hammering, came the song of a red-winged 
blackbird, and I looked up to see a well-established stand of native wild rice dancing as a 
pair of birds flitted in and out of it.  They lighted on the slender green stalks, nibbling on 
yellow grains that bulged with midsummer ripeness.  Calling joyfully to each other, they 
flew over to the oaks on the riverbank, then back to the rice once more.  Seven feet above 
the muddy riverbed, the tops of the rice plants swayed as the wind and birds rustled them.  
I rested for a moment, welcoming the wind on that scorching July morning, and reveling 
in the scene unfolding before me: native birds feasting on native plants, filling their 
bellies with an indigenous food source, and scattering more seeds into the mud as they 
shook the stalks in their eagerness.   
This was how it used to—was supposed to—work, and in that moment I caught a 
glimpse of the self-sufficient, ecologically distinct river AWS and NPS were trying to 
revive.  In moments like this, I can imagine what the river must have looked like before 
the city crept up to its banks.  Turning back to work, I looked over at the Robert F. 
Kennedy Stadium in the distance and the smokestacks of the PEPCO power plant on 
nearby Benning Road—monuments of city life that now enclose the Anacostia.  Much of 
the wetlands where the Nacotchtank Indians once collected wild rice in their canoes are 
gone, replaced instead by shipyards, golf courses, and factories.  This once deep and clear 
river is now silted and polluted, running through an intensely urban region of Southwest, 
Southeast, and Northeast Washington, D.C.  Ever since humans first inhabited the 
Anacostia’s watershed region, they have shaped the river through use, navigation, and 
development; however, the river itself has likewise shaped the people in the region by 
inspiring development and culture that is deeply tied to its waters.  Like that of the 
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Androscoggin and Los Angeles Rivers, the story of the Anacostia’s decline is intricately 
entwined with the city’s maturation as a metropolis, and the river’s ecological destruction 
parallels the establishment of industrial and undesirable space within the city.   
 
The Anacostia River 
It has been decades since the Anacostia River has produced fish that are safe for 
humans to eat, or was even clean enough for humans to safely swim in its waters.  The 
river’s watershed is made up of a network of streams running through eastern 
Washington, D.C. and Maryland, an area totaling up to 176 square miles.98  At Hains 
Point, a man-made peninsula dividing the Washington Shipping Channel from the 
Potomac River, the Anacostia finishes its 8.5-mile run and spills into the Potomac River.  
At this confluence, the two waters mix and eventually make their way to the Chesapeake 
Bay, where they continue onto the Atlantic Ocean.99  In the years since the Anacostia 
became an urban river, its course, ecology, and character have been deeply altered so that 
today it is almost unrecognizable from the river encountered by early European explorers. 
When navigated by Captain John Smith in 1608, the river was crystal clear with a 
depth of forty feet: an ideal port for the trading ships that imported slaves from Africa 
and exported tobacco back to the Old World.100 101 102  Like other tributaries to the 
Chesapeake Bay, the Anacostia is a tidal river, and its fluctuating waterline originally 
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supported an incredible 2,500 acres of wetlands.103  Immense populations of shad once 
spawned there, laying their eggs in the wetlands before making their way back to the 
Atlantic.  Brown bullhead catfish foraged along the riverbed and herrings, white perch, 
and striped bass swam through stands of spatterdock and arrow arum, hiding from birds 
of prey like bald eagles, osprey, kingfishers, and egrets. 104  The region’s native people, 
the Nacotchtank Indians, moved through these wetlands in canoes: fishing for perch and 
bass and harvesting wild rice.  However, not long after Europeans landed on the river’s 
shore, the use and ecology of the Anacostia changed dramatically.   
As European colonists flooded to the New World during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, port towns such as Bladensburg, Colmar Manor, and Cottage City 
sprang up along the river’s Maryland side.  As historian John R. Wennersten remarked, 
“A moderate climate and an attractive landscape lured hundreds of colonists, who in turn 
made the region uninhabitable for its former residents.”105  Bringing with them very 
different philosophies of land use than had previously been practiced by the Nacotchtank 
Indians, European settlers immediately set about altering the landscape they encountered 
on the banks of the Anacostia.  Arguably the most transformative practice the Europeans 
brought with them to the New World was tobacco farming.106  Indeed, towns such as 
Bladensburg were completely dependent on the tobacco trade, and their development 
boomed while tobacco prices soared.  However, although the monetary returns were 
significant, raising tobacco crop was extremely detrimental to the watershed’s ecological 
health.  Colonists could only expect a single tobacco field to produce viable harvests for 	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four years before its nitrogen and potassium levels plummeted.107  The crop’s intense 
nutrient extraction encouraged colonists to adopt wasteful land practices that drastically 
changed the watershed’s landscape so that “[i]n less than a decade, land went from forest 
to tobacco fields to broom sedge and little pines.”108  Rather than wait twenty years for 
the soil nutrients to replenish themselves, colonists simply cleared more forested land and 
started over.109  Depletion of forests, however, did little to discourage the crop’s 
expansion, and tobacco farming continued to grow throughout the watershed as slavery 
arrived in the region.   
The dawn of slavery in the mid-Atlantic encouraged the development of large 
tobacco plantations, so that land along the Anacostia was consolidated into ownership by 
the region’s small but powerful planter elite.110  Protecting their authority through 
political clout, economic resources, and advantageous inter-marriages, ten elite families 
dominated life along the river.111  As Wennersten argued,  
The development of Chesapeake tobacco agriculture into a labor system 
based on caste, race, and severe social control encouraged the 
development of a patriarchy in which white planters controlled or sought 
to control nearly every aspect of agrarian life—from work to diet to social 
relations, religion, and sexual activity.112  
 
The Anacostia’s planter elite maintained its influence as settlements throughout the 
region expanded.  With few checks to their power, they dictated port town politics and 
shaped the nature of the region’s development.  However, intense agricultural 
exploitation of the watershed region reached a tipping point by the late 1770s, setting off 	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a series of rapid ecological transformations.113  After over a century of heavy agriculture 
that all but deforested the region, the watershed’s soils were steadily slipping into the 
river.  “Thousands of tons of topsoil could be carried away in a single rainstorm,” so that 
the Anacostia’s once deep channel was so heavily silted that ships could no longer make 
it to the port at Bladensburg.114  The river that once served as a convenient highway 
between the watershed’s tobacco fields and trading posts along the Chesapeake Bay had 
already undergone a significant environmental transformation by the time of the 
country’s birth.  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Cattle	  drink	  in	  wetlands	  along	  the	  Anacostia.	  	  Note	  the	  Capitol	  dome	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  tree	  in	  
the	  background,	  n.d..	  	  Source:	  http://www.nps.gov/anac/naturescience/plants.htm.	  	  
 As Washington established itself as the nation’s capital city, the Anacostia 
became central to its industrial and naval operations.  Pierre L’Enfant, who designed 
much the District, had grand ideas for the river in his original renderings of the city.  
However influential landholders in the District’s Northwest port of Georgetown and lack 
of investor interest cut short his plans.115  While the Southeast waterfront never became a 
bustling port like Georgetown, it was somewhat developed with the construction of the 
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Washington Navy Yard in 1799.  Manufacturing at the Navy Yard would continue until 
the 1960s and, although it changed from shipbuilding to ordnance creation, the Navy 
Yard’s heavy industry had grave implications on the river’s ecological health. 
Apart from new industrial activity along the Southeast waterfront, the Anacostia 
River was also stressed by the District’s population boom during the Civil War.  In an 
effort to keep up with the District’s growing size, city officials devised sanitation services 
to accommodate all the human waste that now needed disposing.  Just as the Los Angeles 
River suffered as its city’s population boomed and industry expanded along its banks, the 
Anacostia declined as Washington used it as a drain for its effluence.116  The resulting 
sewer system was disjointed so that, by the turn of the nineteenth century, Northwest, 
D.C. had an established networked of belowground pipes, while “a sizeable portion of 
Capitol Hill and the navy yard still resorted to gravity-flow pipe sewers that emptied 
directly into the Anacostia River.”117  Around the time of the Civil War, the gravity-flow 
model was replaced with a combined sewer system that is still in use today.  This system 
collects rainwater and raw sewage in the same pipes, which can only accommodate a 
certain volume of waste.  As a result, heavy rains or snowfalls cause frequent overflows, 
which annually dump two billion gallons of raw sewage into the Anacostia through 
numerous outfalls.  “By the late twentieth century the District had no less than seventeen 
CSOs [Combined Sewer Outfalls] dumping untreated sewage and storm runoff…directly 
into the river,” McCool explains.118  Overflows can boost the populations of bacteria such 
as fecal coliform and also cause dangerous dissolved oxygen levels to form in the 
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Anacostia, making its waters uninhabitable for many aquatic species.119  Writing about 
Washington’s poor sewage system during the post-war period, anthropologist Brett 
Williams notes,  
When the tide fell during these years, sewage choked the thick aquatic 
grasses, burbled and fermented, and welcomed malarial mosquitoes, 
especially during Washington’s oppressive summers.  Employees at the 
Navy Yard, along with inmates at the D.C. Jail and the Government 
Hospital for the Insane [St. Elizabeth’s Hospital], suffered and died from 
malaria at alarming rates.120  
  
Once malaria was linked to wetlands in the early 1900s, the river—not the inadequate 
sewage system—was targeted as the problem, and Congress funded engineering projects 
that would not only dredge the river to enhance its navigability, but also reclaim the 
river’s wetlands to staunch the spread of malaria.  While the sewer system in Southeast 
was gradually improved, the sewage outfalls still exist and continue to dump raw sewage 
and storm water runoff directly into the river whenever the system overflows.  The storm 
water in these overflows can be equally detrimental to the river’s health, as runoff from 
well-trafficked city streets brings with it heavy metals and oils spewed from cars as well 
as any trash littered along the sidewalks.    
Although the District’s antiquated combined sewer system has had a lasting 
ecological impact, the most devastating environmental change to the Anacostia was the 
reclamation of its wetlands during the twentieth century.  Like the Los Angeles River and 
so many other waterways throughout the country, the primary actor in the Anacostia’s 
process of mechanization was the Army Corps of Engineers.  As the nation’s capital grew 
into a metropolis, the river’s ebbing tides and flexible course became a threat to new 	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housing and business development.  By 1913, spring and summer flooding prompted 
Congress to provide the Corps with $400,000 with which to tame the river.121  Using this 
money to drastically transform the course of the river, the Corps “laid 33,158 cubic yards 
of riprap along the river’s banks and constructed a sea wall 1,465 feet in length between 
the Anacostia and Pennsylvania Avenue bridges.”122  The Corps’ efforts to control the 
river continued into the following year as they covered more wetlands with masonry and 
dredged silt from the river’s channel.123  Just as the Los Angeles River’s mechanization 
emerged as an effort to protect residents in its watershed from damaging floods, the 
channelization of the Anacostia marked an effort to prevent the spread of malaria from 
the river’s polluted wetlands into Washington.124   
Despite its lofty goals, the project advanced haltingly.  In 1916, when engineering 
costs finally became too high to justify, the Corps’ goal changed from increasing making 
navigability to repurposing it “as a massive public park.”125  However, even this watered-
down goal failed when drained wetlands flooded and heavy silt deposits foiled further 
dredging.126  The one park that did come out of this project was Kingman Island, a man-
made island that was never developed as a commercial venue and today is operated as a 
recreation site by a local environmental non-profit.  With so many obstacles in the way of 
the river’s reclamation, the Corps turned its attention elsewhere, and the Anacostia was 
once again abandoned.  “To see the Anacostia in the 1930s was to see a river completely 
subjugated by rip-rap, sea walls, dredge spoil, and sewage outfalls,” Wennersten 	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writes.127  After years of engineering and experimentation, the Anacostia joined a long 
list of American waterways that had been manipulated and subdued by the Army Corps 
of Engineers.   
The Corps’ mechanization of the Anacostia transformed the river’s winding 
wetlands into a straight channel, replacing its ecosystem with a shallow, muddy canal.  
The removal of the river’s wetlands took away an important ecological mechanism that 
not only cleaned the river but also sustained it by preventing erosion and supporting 
wildlife.  With this final blow, the Army Corps of Engineers reshaped the Anacostia into 
something utterly unnatural.  As river reclamation projects on the Anacostia fell in and 
out of vogue throughout the twentieth century, the Army Corps of Engineers and Civilian 
Conservation Corps removed an astonishing ninety-six percent of the Anacostia’s 
wetlands. 128 129   By the time this period of mechanization ended, the Anacostia had been 
developed and channelized, and today its riverbanks support only 150 acres of riparian 
wetlands.130  Overtime, stressed by years of intense trade, agricultural erosion, and 
riverside occupation, the Anacostia’s depth shrank to an incredibly slim three feet, and 
the water became an opaque, muddy brown.131  According to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), over 20,000 tons of litter—discarded tires, plastic 
bags, organic matter, or plastic bottles—enters the Anacostia on an annual basis. 132  
Much of this litter ends up in the water after routine combined sewer overflows, but a 
significant portion is directly left by people who regard the river as a dump.  Everything 	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from Styrofoam containers to ATM machines and dead bodies has been found in the 
Anacostia, abandoned by people who believed this long forgotten river would conceal 
litter, theft, and even murder.          
	  
Figure	  5:	  A	  Black-­crowned	  Night	  Heron	  catches	  a	  fish	  amidst	  litter	  on	  the	  Anacostia,	  n.d..	  	  Source:	  
http://www.examiner.com/slideshow/anacostia-­river-­pollution.	   
Relentless pollution of the river, caused by storm water runoff, sewer overflows, 
and illegal dumping, has wreacked havoc on the Anacostia’s ecosystem.  In 1993, the 
Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin reported, “the sediments of specific 
areas of the tidal Anacostia River contain substantially higher concentrations of lead, 
cadmium, zinc, PCBs, chlordanes, hydrocarbons, and other contaminants than the 
Potomac River, the Washington Ship Channel, and the Tidal Basin.”133  The river’s 
ecological destruction is best exemplified by the decline of the brown bullhead catfish, a 
keystone species in the Anacostia.  Catfish forage in the polluted sediment, eating almost 
anything that falls to the river’s bottom, whether it’s organic matter, small fish, insects or 
even man-made garbage.  As a result of their contaminated diet, an incredible two-thirds 
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of the Anacostia’s population of bullhead catfish now suffer from tumors. 134  Issues with 
the river’s wildlife also impact humans, as angling is still popular among many District 
residents, despite the river’s severe pollution.  “Fatty tissue of fish eaten by anglers can 
contain harmful heavy metals and toxics,” the African American Environmentalists 
Association (AAEA) warned in a report released in 2000 on the District’s environmental 
justice issues.135  Despite efforts by the D.C. government and local environmental 
nonprofits to post signage and warn anglers about the dangers of ingesting fish from the 
river, fishing remains a popular pastime along the Anacostia.  Although the river has 
historically had great cultural importance to residents of waterfront neighborhoods, 
contact with the river today can lead to serious health effects.  According to the AAEA, 
“[E]xposure to toxic pollutants can cause immediate short-term human health effects 
such as respiratory irritation, and permanent health problems such as cancer, heart failure, 
kidney and liver damage, and anemia.” 136  As the residents living in the neighborhoods 
closest to the Anacostia are predominantly African American, the river itself presents a 
serious environmental injustice.    
By the late 1980s, ecological and environmental justice concerns led to a period 
of litigation between concerned citizens and local and federal governments that resulted 
not only in publicizing the river’s anemic ecosystem, but also in the formation of 
important advocacy groups.  One of these groups, the Anacostia Watershed Society 
(AWS), has focused its attention on the river’s ecological restoration since 1989.  
Founded by watershed resident Robert Boone, AWS drew attention to the river’s plight 
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through a series of minor law suits and the establishment of working relationships 
between environmental activists and community members in impacted neighborhoods.137  
One of the group’s most significant victories came in the mid-1990s when AWS and 
concerned community members came together to prevent the construction of a new 
riverfront football stadium for the Washington Redskins.138  This development threatened 
not only to increase storm water runoff into the river by creating more impervious 
surfaces such as parking lots, but also its construction could have changed the 
neighborhood into a tourist destination rather than a community.139  These social and 
ecological problems were avoided by AWS’s partnership with local community 
leaders.140  Following up this victory with a number of major law suits, including one 
against the U.S. Navy, AWS solidified its reputation as a leader in local environmental 
politics.  Today, AWS continues to rely on relationships with waterfront communities, 
and they write in their vision statement, “AWS seeks win-win solutions through strong 
partnerships and coalitions, with all parts of the community, government, and other 
stakeholders.”141  Through community relationships, public protest, and political and 
legal activity, AWS has successfully changed the language about the Anacostia from 
remembering the river to ‘rediscovering’ it.   
Groups like AWS have brought the Anacostia’s ecological deterioration to the 
forefront of local environmental politics.  Successful legal battles and media campaigns 
have led to achievements such as holding the designation of the Washington Navy Yard 	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as an EPA Superfund site and establishing the D.C. bag tax, a five-cent tax on plastic 
bags that contributes to a clean up fund for the Anacostia.  However, as the river 
exclusively flows through the city’s inner core, responsibility for its ecological health still 
seems abstract to many of the District’s residents who live far from the Anacostia 
waterfront.  Running along the city’s most industrial, impoverished, and ignored region, 
the Anacostia is still considered an extension of these neighborhoods—a kind of 
ecological slum.  While environmental education, stewardship, and restoration programs 
have flourished throughout Washington in recent years, activists and advocates working 
to clean up the Anacostia continue to fight an uphill battle as political and economic 
power is still clustered away from the river.      
 
The Washington Navy Yard 
In 1799 the federal government acquired a thirty-seven-acre parcel of land along 
the Anacostia River at the cost of $4,000, and designated it the Washington Navy 
Yard.142 143  Selected by President George Washington, the site became the Navy’s first 
shipyard, and Congress initially funded the building of six large wooden warships 
there.144 145  “In a short time it became both shipyard and the repair facility for the entire 
fleet,” so that it was quickly fully staffed and functioning as the city’s largest industry.146  
During its early years, the Navy Yard was remembered for “[i]ts high ship houses, [and] 	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its immense anchor shop, whose molten fires and inky clouds of smoke reminded one of 
Dante’s Inferno.”147  However, the centrality of the Navy Yard fluctuated as presidential 
notions of military preparedness shifted.  Thomas Jefferson, for example, was responsible 
for shutting down nearly all activity at the Navy Yard because he thought military 
preparedness implied a need for perpetual war.148  Jefferson’s philosophy had a profound 
impact on the Navy Yard so that, even during the War of 1812, the shipyard’s strategic 
value was largely ignored.  Although the presence of war certainly increased production 
at the Navy Yard, the importance of the shipyard itself was not considered in military 
defense plans.149  Indeed, when the British invaded Washington in 1814, there were no 
soldiers mustered to protect the Yard from invasion.150  As the British advanced, the 
Navy Yard’s inaugural commandant, Commodore Thomas Tingey, ordered that the 
shipyard be set ablaze rather than overtaken by the British army.151  Like the many fires 
the British had set throughout the city during their siege of Washington, Tingey’s act of 
arson burned this Washington establishment to the ground.  “Not only were the buildings 
burned and the shipping ravaged, but the…[commandant’s] own provisions, loaded on an 
old gunboat, were ransacked by plundering neighbors,” the Sunday Star reported of this 
significant event in the Navy Yard’s history.152  After the Yard was torched, the first 
chapter of its long history came to a close. 
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Rebuilt after the War of 1812, the Navy Yard again came of importance during 
the Civil War as both a shipyard and a holding place for Confederate prisoners.153  
Military officials in the Civil War learned from their predecessors’ mistakes and 
recognized the Yard’s strategic importance.  “The ships and stores were often threatened 
by attacks from the South and employees were required to take the oath of allegiance to 
their country every night before going home,” reflected a 1971 Washington Post article 
on the Navy Yard’s history.154  Jumpstarted by military demands during the Civil War, 
industry expanded along South Capitol Street, which bordered the shipyard, and soon the 
area hosted factories producing goods including processed sugar, natural gas, pottery, and 
beer.155 156  Despite the expansion of other factory jobs, “[t]he navy yard continued as the 
city’s largest single employer,” further solidifying its important relationship with the 
District’s residents.157  Heavy industry at the Navy Yard nevertheless had its drawbacks, 
as “factory waste” was thoughtlessly dumped in the Anacostia throughout this period of 
Civil War shipbuilding.158  While wartime needs caused industry to boom at the Navy 
Yard, the development of larger, deep draft iron and steel ships, such as the USS 
Monitor, at the close of the Civil War changed the use of the Navy Yard once again.159  
As noted earlier, a long history of poor agricultural practices on tobacco plantations 
throughout the watershed caused substantial soil erosion that overtime silted up the 
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Anacostia, so that the Navy’s new warships could no longer make it upriver to the 
shipyard.160   
	  
Figure	  6:	  Colored	  lithograph	  of	  the	  Washington	  Navy	  Yard,	  1862.	  	  Source:	  
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h79000/h79896k.jpg. 
Unable to accommodate modern warships, the Navy Yard underwent its second 
transformation, this time from shipyard to gun factory in 1883.161  As modern warships 
were equipped with guns, rather than antiquated cannons, the Navy retrofitted the Yard 
into a factory designed to build specialized ordnances for new Navy ships.162  “For a 
decade the new guns were fired on the water front,” the Washington Times-Herald 
remembered, “but the city grew too big for that.”163  Eventually, test facilities were 
moved to more remote locations on the Potomac River, but manufacturing continued at 
the Navy Yard.164  Besides ordnances, factories at the Yard also produced, “steam 
engines, propellers, and other types of hardware to be used for refitting the remaining 
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ships in the fleet.”165  In 1893, ten years after the Yard completed its transition from 
shipyard to gun factory, the Washington Evening Star reported, “The large ship house has 
disappeared.  The old war ships come here no more and many branches of work have 
been transferred to other yards.”166  Although the shipyard and gun test facilities moved 
elsewhere, industry grew at the Navy Yard as the United States became a leading world 
power and naval technology advanced.  Wennersten writes, “A military behemoth had 
arisen on the banks of the Anacostia that would transform modern warfare while 
polluting the river with its industrial waste.”167  Supplanting environmental forethought 
with technological advancement, the U.S. Navy was responsible for solidifying the 
Anacostia’s identity as an industrialized river.   
	  
Figure	  7:	  Aerial	  photograph	  of	  the	  Washington	  Navy	  Yard,	  1918.	  	  Source:	  
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g450000/g454990.jpg	  
The Anacostia continued to take in the Navy Yard’s effluence as the Navy grew, 
and industry at the Yard peaked during World War II.  Even before the United States 
officially entered the war, the gun factory at the Navy Yard was operating on a twenty-	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four-hour schedule and employing 15,000 men.168  In June 1941, the Washington Times-
Herald boasted, “It’s about time to kill that old saw about Washington having no heavy 
industry.”169  By 1942, in the thick of World War II, the Navy seized additional land 
across M Street, uprooting five neighborhood blocks to make way for more 
manufacturing plants.170  Although the Navy Yard expanded its factories, industrial 
activity slowed after the close of World War II, and eventually stopped all together in 
1961.  While half the land remained under Navy operation, the other half was deeded to 
the Government Services Administration (later General Services Administration), who 
eventually turned it into a now-demolished mixed use complex called Southeast Federal 
Center.171   
	  
Figure	  8:	  Workers	  operate	  lathes	  in	  the	  Naval	  Gun	  Factory,	  1943.	  	  Source:	  
http://www.practicalmachinist.com/vb/antique-­machinery-­history/naval-­gun-­factory-­d-­c-­1943-­pic-­
192009/.	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Roberts, “Force of 15,000.”	  
169 Ibid.  
170 “Navy Yard Condemnation Bewilders Tenants,” Washington Daily News, April 4, 
1942. 
171 Von Eckardt, “Ghost of America.”  
	   65	  
The Navy Yard’s third and final transition from gun factory to offices led to a 
major shift in land use that resulted in countless proposals for redevelopment in the area, 
Southeast Federal Center among them.  However, by the 1960s the Yard’s legacy of 
heavy industry had forever changed the character of both the neighborhood and the river.  
“Sometimes a stiff breeze comes upriver, and there is a faint smell of the salty ocean far 
away, but the stronger taint comes from the dead fish floating belly-up in the channel,” 
the Washington Post wrote of the Navy Yard in 1965.172  Over a century of 
manufacturing and poor waste management practices at the Navy Yard sickened the river 
so that it came to function more as a sink into which the Navy flushed its effluence, rather 
than a thriving, resilient ecosystem.  While residents in the surrounding neighborhoods 
had been concerned about the Navy Yard’s impact on the health of the river and their 
communities, few politicians were willing to challenge the Navy to change its ways.173  
Meaningful investigation into the Navy’s exploitation of the Anacostia didn’t begin until 
the 1990s, when environmental activists finally took matters into their own hands.  The 
environmental organization, Greenpeace, conducted one of the first of these 
investigations in 1995 to alarming results.174  Heavy industrial activity at the Navy Yard’s 
waterfront factory dumped toxins including polycylic biphenols (PCBs), lead, mercury, 
chromium, copper, nickel, silver, and zinc into the Anacostia River over a period of 
nearly eighty years.175  Perhaps the most startling revelation from the Greenpeace 
investigation was that, in clear violation of the Clean Water Act, “[a] number of federal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Richard Corrigan, “Bills Consider Navy Yard’s History,” Washington Post, May 3, 
1965. 
173 Wennersten, Anacostia, 206. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Vernon Loeb, “EPA Orders Cleanup of Navy Yard,” Washington Post, January 12, 
1997. 
	   66	  
agencies, most notably the U.S. Department of the Interior, had long been aware of the 
[Navy’s dumping practices] but had done nothing with the information in their 
possession.”176  The Clean Water Act, passed in 1972, outlaws the kind of direct dumping 
that the factories at the Navy Yard had engaged in for decades.  During this period of 
thoughtless contamination along the Anacostia, pollution from industrial runoff and 
sewer overflows soiled the river to the extent that it became unswimmable and 
unfishable.177  Smelly, muddy, and dotted with litter and dead fish, the Anacostia was a 
hard sell for redevelopers looking to make a profit off of waterfront shops or 
condominiums. 
	  
Figure	  9:	  An	  aerial	  view	  of	  the	  Washington	  Navy	  Yard	  showcasing	  heavy	  silt	  from	  erosion	  into	  the	  
Anacostia,	  1973.	  	  Source:	  
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/dd/AERIAL_VIEW_OF_THE_WASHINGTON_NAVY_Y
ARD_AND_THE_ANACOSTIA_RIVER._EXCESSIVE_SILT_CAUSES_THE_BROWN_COLOR_OF_THE_WA.	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Following a national trend of environmental activism and litigation, a coalition of 
environmental and community organizations seized on the Greenpeace study to set river 
restoration in motion by suing the U.S. Navy in the mid-1990s.  The suit brought much 
needed attention to the plight of the Anacostia, finally pegging the U.S. Navy as 
responsible for much of the river’s ecological decline.  The plaintiffs in the case were 
AWS and Earth Justice, an environmental law nonprofit, as well as the Barry Farms 
Residents Association and the Kingman Park Civic Association, which are both 
community organizations from predominantly African American waterfront 
neighborhoods.178  Together these local stakeholders sued a powerful arm of the federal 
government for emitting pollutants in types and quantities outlawed by the Clean Water 
Act.179  Ruling in the plaintiffs favor, the court required the Navy to begin an 
investigation and clean up of the Navy Yard’s toxic emissions.180  Through these 
investigations, the Navy “discovered a number of contaminated waste sites dating back to 
the yard’s days as an armaments facility and containing PCBs, mercury, lead, mineral 
spirits, paint, batteries, spilled fuel, adhesives, and acids among other things.”181  The 
Navy designed a rigorous clean up program of these pollutants that included removal of 
lead paint, contaminated soil, and oil storage tanks, redesign of the drainage system to 
prevent further runoff, and creation of neighborhood outreach programs in environmental 
stewardship.182  Though these efforts were significant, they were simply one part of a 
long process of pollution remediation and ecological restoration on the Anacostia.  As 
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Wennersten wrote, the Navy’s environmental investigations during its clean up process 
“simply confirmed the fact that for over a century the navy yard had considered the 
Anacostia as nothing more than a convenient repository for waste.”183  While the Navy’s 
initial quick fixes were valuable, the real challenge persists in changing the military and 
the city’s conceptions of the river from a dump to something to be cherished and restored.          
The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund continued the fight to restore the Anacostia, 
and ended a two-year legal battle with the U.S. Navy and General Services 
Administration (GSA) in 1998 when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
designated the Navy Yard as a Superfund hazardous waste site.184  This distinction is 
given to locations, such as illegal dumping or chemical spill sites, where hazardous waste 
and contaminants are “uncontrolled.”185  According to the EPA, presence of Polyaromatic 
Hydrocarbons (PAHs), lead, dioxins, and other heavy metals within soil, groundwater, 
and building samples were the main contaminants responsible for landing the Navy Yard 
on the agency’s Superfund list.186  The Navy, the District Department of the Environment 
(DDOE), and the EPA have collaborated since 1998 to remediate the site’s legacy of 
toxic waste by sampling soil and groundwater throughout the various shops and industrial 
buildings, removing contaminants, and retrofitting storm drains to prevent further toxic 
runoff.187  Now some fifteen years later, the clean up process is still incomplete and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Ibid. 
184 Steve Vogel, “Navy Yard to Go on EPA List: 2 Military Sites in Prince George’s Are 
Proposed for Superfund,” Washington Post, July 24, 1998. 
185 “Cleaning Up the Nation’s Hazardous Waste Site,” U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, accessed March 23, 2013, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/index.htm.   
186 “Washington Navy Yard: Current Site Information,” U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, accessed March 23, 2013, 
http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/npl/DC9170024310.htm. 
187 Ibid. 
	   69	  
according to the EPA’s website, bureaucratic disagreements between the three agencies 
have put the process at a standstill.188  The Navy Yard Superfund site’s webpage projects 
that the clean up will be finished in 2015, however bureaucratic hold-ups could push the 
date back even further.   
After more than two centuries of operation, the Navy Yard completed a 
remarkable transformation from shipyard to Superfund site, and its changing land use left 
a significant mark on the health of both the waterfront neighborhood and the Anacostia 
River.  As an establishment almost as old as the nation itself, the Navy Yard is a perfect 
example of the bureaucratic processes and single-minded approach that so often stymies 
the federal government.  “From its inception,” Wennersten writes, “the navy yard was the 
most significant employer on the Washington waterfront, and it had a major impact along 
the Anacostia River.”189  Land use at the Navy Yard reflected the needs of the age, as 
operations there shifted from shipbuilding to ordnance manufacturing, and finally to 
environmental remediation.  Just as tobacco plantations exploited the land along the 
Anacostia with little thought of erosion or deforestation, the U.S. Navy industrialized the 
river’s waterfront with few considerations for the industry’s long-term impact on the 
river’s ecology.   
 
Near Southeast 
When the Navy Yard broke ground in the 1799, its surrounding neighborhood 
was actually quite established.  The neighborhood across M Street from the Navy Yard 
was home to Stanton Town, an active community occupying the land now called Near 	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Southeast. 190 In Stanton Town, “[t]he houses were primitive in the extreme,” and life had 
the character more of a rural village than a bustling city.191  In December 1893, the 
Washington Evening Star noted that District residents had long conceptualized the Navy 
Yard as separate from the rest of the city.192  When first established, the reporter 
reminisced of the shipyard, “it was regarded as a sort of caudal appendage to the city, 
while our ‘city’ brethren in their vanity were wont to look upon the dwellers therein as 
akin to country cousins…and the place a rural hamlet.”193  Created only a few years after 
Washington itself, the Navy Yard mapped out a new kind of space in which urban 
industry and rural living converged.  Since the establishment of the Navy Yard began a 
history of industrial presence along the Southeast waterfront, Near Southeast has 
struggled with its own relevance as a residential neighborhood nestled in a heavily 
industrialized region.        
While the Anacostia was still relatively untamed when the Navy Yard began 
operation, the river’s ecology and the neighborhood’s identity grew increasingly urban as 
industry expanded at the Navy Yard.  At the end of the eighteenth century, “wild ducks 
were…plentiful in the Eastern branch, and other game could be found in abundance near 
by [sic] and where the rollicking [shipbuilder] got in his fine work.”194  Though legally 
established as a part of the city, the Navy Yard and its surrounding neighborhood were 
essentially wild spaces—in every sense of the word.  In 1893 the Washington Evening 
Star recalled, “[A] trip to the Navy Yard was a thing not to be entered into lightly or 
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inadvisedly [sic], but with the fear of the Lord and the pugnacious Navy Yard boy before 
our eyes.”195  The short streetcar ride from the established port of Georgetown to the 
Navy’s fledgling shipyard in Southeast brought visitors to a rough and disorderly 
neighborhood where shipbuilders resided and recreated.196  In the 1890s, many Navy 
Yard employees lived in the surrounding neighborhood, and “with rod and gun whiled 
away the hours along the bright waters of the Anacostia; or regaled…friends at the Union 
House…with many a fish story or told of marvelous shots made with [a] single barrel 
shotgun ‘across the branch.’”197  By the turn of the nineteenth century, however, 
increased industrial activity along the waterfront distanced Near Southeast from its 
previous rural identity.    
The first years of the twentieth century saw the beginning of a chain of industrial 
developments along the Anacostia’s Southeast waterfront.  “Increasingly, the riverfront 
was being defined by the industrial processes established there,” Wennersten writes.198  
While the neighborhoods of Fairlawn, Union Town (later Anacostia), Barry Farms, and 
others across the river from the Navy Yard in Far Southeast remained rural well into the 
twentieth century, Near Southeast’s proximity to the Navy Yard and its fast 
industrializing waterfront quickly turned it into an urbanized neighborhood.  In a very 
short period of time, the land use around the Navy Yard went from recreation to heavy 
industry.  While the Navy Yard churned out more advanced ordnances from its immense 
gun factory, other manufacturing plants sprang up along the river, including a sewage 
treatment plant, as well as, “a grid of steam brick works, lumber yards, coal yards, ice 	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houses, scrap yards, saw mills, and the sprawling Washington Gaslight Company 
between 12th and 13th Streets, SE and the river.”199  Residents of Near Southeast became 
literally tangled in industry by the early twentieth century, as smokestacks dotted the 
waterfront and railways threaded through the neighborhood and along the river’s edge.200  
As a neighborhood that had historically identified with the river, Near Southeast suddenly 
found itself in the midst of a drastic transformation. Wennersten writes,  
The Washington Gaslight Company put in large coal piers north of the 
navy yard, while other companies like Smoot Sand and Gravel, a sewage 
disposal plant, and the Columbia Granite and Dredging Company 
wharves, together with the railroads, cut off the river from the community 
it had once served.201 
 
However, while the development that fanned out along the waterfront from the Navy 
Yard set the neighborhood’s industrialization in motion, it also provided the region with 
stable manufacturing jobs that drew more residents to the area. 
Throughout its transition from “rural hamlet” to industrial waterfront, Near 
Southeast maintained a working class population.202  Historian David Passonneau writes 
of the rise of manufacturing in Near Southeast, “Its demand for unskilled labor helped a 
new immigrant group establish a foothold in America, and the old buildings near the yard 
provided affordable housing.”203  Many of the immigrants who settled near the Navy 
Yard were Eastern European, and helped establish what was, for a time, a thriving Jewish 
community in Near Southeast.  According to Passonneau, these immigrants “sold kosher 
food, opened haberdashery stores, and formed the Southeast Hebrew congregation, all 	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within four blocks of the Navy Yard’s main gate.”204  While industry and small-scale 
commercial ventures flourished in Near Southeast throughout the early twentieth century, 
the neighborhood remained a working class enclave, frequented mostly by those who 
lived and worked there.  In 1932, District historian James F. Duhamel observed, “Despite 
its comparatively large population…the Navy Yard section never had a theater of its own, 
a newspaper or even a ‘circus grounds.’”205  Near Southeast became one of the most 
established communities in the District, however its lack of cultural attractions speaks to 
its identity as an industrial, working class neighborhood.  
For much of the beginning of the twentieth century, Near Southeast was shared by 
Eastern European immigrants and working class African Americans.  “Many middle-
class blacks…held blue-collar jobs with good wages at the Navy Yard,” Passonneau 
writes, and opportunities expanded there as World War II increased demand for the 
weapons it manufactured.206  Though many of Near Southeast’s residents were middle 
class, their race prevented them from moving out of the District’s downtown.  While 
Near Southeast’s white residents eventually had the mobility to join other white urbanites 
in their flight to the streetcar suburbs that spread along the District’s northwest border 
during the early 1900s, African American urbanites remained trapped in the city because 
of housing segregation.  As anthropologist Brett Williams writes in her study of 
Southeast, Washington, “African American residents of the city had been crammed by 
streetcar suburbs’ restrictive covenants into a tiny black belt stretching north of the 
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governmental/monumental core up to Florida Avenue Northwest.”207  Many 
neighborhoods within this region were crowded slums with improper sanitation.208  
Although Near Southeast was never reduced to slumland, it was impacted by the poverty 
in other African American neighborhoods throughout Washington.   
Working to clean up its downtown during the 1930s, the District created the Alley 
Dwelling Authority and charged it with providing subsidized housing to homeless people 
and those who had lived on cleared slum land.209  As many of these dislocated residents 
were African American, segregation and lack of economic mobility left them with few 
housing options, and Near Southeast was a possibility for some “families [that] were 
crowded out of other areas by alley clearance and slum reclamation projects.”210  
However, the neighborhood’s proximity to federal land meant that, even in Near 
Southeast, housing was not always secure.    	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  10:	  An	  alley	  near	  the	  Capitol	  building	  (dome	  visible	  in	  the	  background),	  1935.	  	  Source:	  
http://johnedwinmason.typepad.com/john_edwin_mason_photogra/carl-­mydans/.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Williams, “A River Runs Through Us,” 419. 
208 Ibid. 
209 “Records of the National Capital Housing Authority,” National Archives, accessed 
March 24, 2013, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/302.html.   
210 “Navy Yard Condemnation.” 
	   75	  
While the Navy Yard was a major employer in the area, African Americans in 
Near Southeast nevertheless had a complex relationship with the plant, and these 
complexities came to a head during the early years of World War II.  In 1942, the 
relationship between the Navy Yard and African American residents of Near Southeast 
strained when the Navy seized a swath of land across M Street that housed five 
residential blocks, railroad tracks operated by the Philadelphia, Baltimore and 
Washington Railroad Company, and a few working factories.211  Hoping to expand the 
gun factory to accommodate wartime needs, the Navy selected this region across the 
street from its operating plant.  Part of this area consisted of “solidly built small houses, 
occupied by Negro families and swarming with children.”212  The residential blocks 
within the region the Navy seized contained 156 families who were “all Negro families in 
low-income brackets,” making an average monthly income of one hundred dollars.213 214  
Although the residents fought against this use of eminent domain by working with the 
Department of Justice to file a condemnation suit against the Navy, they were ultimately 
unsuccessful.  The Housing Association determined, “[H]ousing for Negroes has reached 
saturation in this area and there is no place to go.”215  The families were eventually 
relocated to rented mobile homes on cleared parkland a little over a mile away, in 
Southwest, Washington.  Because of its location in the midst of waterfront industry, city 
and federal officials often ignored Near Southeast’s significance as a residential 
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neighborhood, resulting in moments such as the Navy’s 1942 seizure of neighborhood 
land for industrial expansion. 
After the Navy Yard closed down its factories at the end of World War II, Near 
Southeast lost most of its manufacturing jobs.  While some industries, such as the sewage 
treatment plant at the O Street Pumping Facility and the Washington Gas Light plant, 
remained in Near Southeast, urban industry gradually fell out of vogue as a postwar 
America attempted to create modern cities.  Williams writes,   
As the capital’s imperial ambitions sought lifelines outside the waterways, 
the city turned its back on its rivers and the affluent moved along streetcar 
and trolley lines up out of the river flats to the north and west.  Left behind 
were the poorer, mostly African American, residents of the District.216 
 
By 1950, the U.S. Census reported that Near Southeast was 89% African American, 10% 
white, and less than 1% “Foreign Born.”217  With government as the city’s main industry 
and so many of its employees living outside of the city in suburbs, the District spent 
much of the postwar years focusing on urban planning.   
During this planning period, city officials overhauled the District’s existing 
structure by rezoning its downtown and redesigning access points into the city by 
constructing new highways and bridges across the river.218  Out of these efforts came the 
11th Street Bridges, completed in 1965.  Designed to ease the commute between 
Maryland’s growing suburbs and the offices downtown, one of the 11th Street Bridges 
ferries in-coming traffic from Interstate 295 across the Anacostia and off to the Southeast 
Freeway which runs through Capitol Hill.  Meanwhile, a tandem bridge carries out-going 
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traffic back to Interstate 295.  While they freed up traffic for commuters, the 11th Street 
Bridges have had a major impact on Near Southeast’s access to the rest of the District.   
The construction of the 11th Street Bridges fell in line with the nation’s postwar 
tendency to build freeways through its inner cities.  The American Interstate Highway 
System developed throughout the 1940s and 1950s as a vehicle for urban redevelopment 
and modernization with the support of major power players in urban politics such as 
mayors, urban planners, and business and real estate owners.219  Washington, D.C. was 
no exception to this pattern, as the postwar period saw the completion of highways and 
bridges such as the Anacostia Freeway in 1945, the Frederick Douglass Memorial Bridge 
(or South Capitol Street Bridge) in 1950, and the Southeast and Barney Circle Freeways 
in 1958.  These freeways and bridges linked the District to the nation’s growing highway 
infrastructure, while also improving commuter access to Washington’s downtown.  Since 
its conception, highway construction was tied to plans to revitalize central business 
districts (CBD) and redevelop inner-city slums, meaning that zoning for highway 
infrastructure specifically targeted minority areas within the inner city.220  In most 
American cities, the CBD was located downtown, in areas that had become surrounded 
by low-income and minority communities after middle class white residents left the city 
during the white flight of the immediate postwar years.  Throughout the drafting of the 
Interstate Highway System, many city planners maintained that revitalization of the CBD 
was crucial to reestablishing the relevance of American cities within a modern, suburban 
nation.  “Virtually all the powerful interests involved in urban America shared these 
widely held views about the links between expressways and ‘reconstruction’ of the 	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postwar city,” Mohl writes.221  However, this urban reconstruction came at the cost of 
immense disruption of minority communities living in inner cities across the nation.  New 
roads and bridges sliced through established minority communities as urban planners and 
developers targeted downtown regions as the epicenter of redevelopment and attempted 
to streamline commuter traffic patterns and increase access to the CBD.   
 Although postwar highways were very often successful in streamlining traffic 
flow and improving access to the CBD, they were also incredibly detrimental to the 
health and integrity of the communities through which they were built.  Furthermore, the 
addition of so many new impervious surfaces exacerbated problems with storm water 
runoff in waterfront cities like Washington.  “Pushing expressways through the social and 
physical fabric of American cities inevitably resulted in housing demolition on a large 
scale, the destruction of entire communities, severe relocation problems, and subsequent 
environmental damage,” Mohl writes.222  Environmental justice activists have long been 
concerned with the national pattern of highway construction, as it typically exposes low-
income and minority communities to higher levels of automobile related pollutants such 
as nitric acid and carbon monoxide.  While traffic moved freely in and out of the 
downtown area, minority communities across the country were left reeling from the loss 
of homes and communities.  
In Near Southeast, the 11th Street Bridges and their corresponding Southeast 
Freeway formed a literal barrier that cordoned off the neighborhood from the rest of the 
District, barreling through Near Southeast’s south side, and cutting up along its western 
border with Capitol Hill.  The construction of the South Capitol Street Bridge increased 	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traffic down the existing South Capitol Street that makes up the neighborhood’s northern 
edge, so that well-trafficked highways eventually enclosed Near Southeast on both sides.  
With its eastern edge bordered by the polluted and neglected Anacostia River, Near 
Southeast exemplifies the incredible isolation that post-war city planners imposed on 
minority neighborhoods in cities across the country.  Williams writes,  
In Washington, these highways demolished poor neighborhoods, 
quarantining poor people from trendy Capitol Hill on the west and from 
the Anacostia River on the east.  D.C. blues musician Nap Turner told me, 
‘The Anacostia Freeway went up the same year as the Berlin Wall.  It 
meant about the same thing.’223   
 
Cut off from the rest of the District by highways, and abandoned as Washington’s 
industrial hub, Near Southeast was easily forgotten by a city that already largely ignored 
the river running through it.        
	  
Figure	  11:	  Near	  Southeast,	  outlined	  in	  red,	  and	  the	  highways	  bordering	  it.	  	  Source:	  
http://maps.google.com/.	   
 Starting in the 1950s and becoming increasingly popular by the 1970s and 1980s, 
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redevelopment projects, often referred to as urban renewal.224  While previous 
redevelopment attempts to increase CBD access through highway construction had 
damaged neighborhoods like Near Southeast by isolating them from the rest of the city, 
redevelopment plans sought to bring business and real estate investors back into 
neglected neighborhoods to raise their standards of living.  The housing project 
developments that came out of this period of city planning are still contested spaces 
today.  After the Housing Act was passed in 1949, city planners set about transforming 
the landscape of the inner city by razing slumland to construct modernist skyscrapers in 
which to house the urban poor.225  Like highway construction, however, these high-rise 
housing projects were typically devised bureaucratically with little community input.226 
Although redevelopment is rarely ethical, it still remains the tool of choice for city 
planners hoping to revitalize impoverished areas.   
City planners’ top-down approach to redevelopment was evident in 2001 when 
the city’s plans and residents’ wishes clashed over the demolition and redevelopment of 
the Arthur Capper Dwellings in Near Southeast.  Constructed in the early 1960s, the 
housing projects at Arthur Capper make up two city blocks between the Southeast 
Freeway and L Street, Southeast.  These projects were constructed simultaneously with 
the highways that enclosed Near Southeast, so that the 700 people who lived at Arthur 
Capper joined a neighborhood community that was harshly isolated from the rest of the 
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city.227  The residents at Arthur Capper represented a range of income brackets and ages 
and, for a time, the project was seen as a progressive approach to public housing.228  An 
established community grew there, utilizing the projects’ baseball diamond and 
basketball courts, and enjoying its proximity to schools, churches, and businesses.229  
However, in 2001, the projects were caught in the crosshairs as the federal government’s 
Housing and Urban Development agency granted the District’s Housing Authority $34.9 
million to demolish Arthur Capper and replace it with mixed-income housing as well as 
retail and office space.230  The demolition of Arthur Capper fell in line with a larger 
national trend to tear down postwar public housing projects and replace them with 
developments for “mixed-income tenancy,” which by the 1990s, scholar Alexander Von 
Hoffman argues, became “seen as a road to uplifting the poor.”231  While Arthur Capper 
was certainly in need of repair by the early 2000s, the higher target income for new 
residents implied that the projects’ current residents would not be able to afford units in 
the new complexes, and had no choice but to move elsewhere.232   
It was a story that had played out all across the District, and was reminiscent of 
the Navy Yard’s use of eminent domain on Near Southeast residents during World War 
II.  Just as slum clearings had originally brought more residents to Near Southeast in the 
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1940s, some of Arthur Capper’s residents had come to Near Southeast after their previous 
homes had been razed in the pursuit of redevelopment.233  “Residents knew each other 
and had carved out a life at Arthur Capper,” the Washington City Paper wrote.234  
“Moving out meant picking either the dicey prospects of a Section 8 voucher [for private 
housing] or braving another public-housing development.”235  Publicly funded 
redevelopment in Near Southeast imposed an environmental injustice on the residents of 
Arthur Capper, as the environment in which they lived, worked, and played was 
destroyed in the name of urban revitalization.   
As the District imagines a new role for the industrial spaces along the waterfront, 
the working-class African American community that has historically resided in Near 
Southeast is discovering that it isn’t included in the District’s new vision.  Williams 
writes, residents “imagine a great sweep, a pernicious master plan to tear down Arthur 
Capper and Carrollsburg and move people to far Southeast.  Their visions are rooted in 
history when that happened before and in the reality of growth politics today.”236  By the 
early 2000s, a neighborhood that created a space for itself during a time of 
industrialization and segregation was undergoing a transformation that threatened to 
redefine Near Southeast’s identity.   
Ringed by highways and closed off by a polluted river, Near Southeast embodies 
the kind of isolated, undesirable land on which urban minority residents were so often 
crowded in American cities.  The neighborhood’s historic population of low-income and 
minority residents were constantly exposed to environmental injustices beginning with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Williams, “A River Runs Through Us,” 427.	  
	   83	  
waterfront industrialization in the early 1800s that continued through the 1900s.  After 
World War II, the federal and local governments’ modernist experimentations with 
highway construction dramatically increased residents’ exposure to toxic emissions from 
automobiles and trapped residents in an isolated built environment.  Threats to 
environmental justice continue today as the communities in which Near Southeast’s 
residents live, work, and play are threatened by changes in public housing policy and 
emerging trends of redevelopment targeting higher-income residents.  Today, 
redevelopment is everywhere in Near Southeast, and has had a mixed impact on the 
neighborhood.  As lower income residents, such as those at the Arthur Capper Dwellings, 
are pushed out of the neighborhood, Near Southeast is being redefined as a hip, 
waterfront neighborhood.  While past municipal attempts at redevelopment merely served 
to isolate the neighborhood from the rest of the District, it remains to be seen what kind 
of impact this new era of redevelopment will have on Near Southeast.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
If You Build It, They Will Come: Redevelopment in Near Southeast  
 
On a sweltering evening in July 2012, the stadium at Nationals Park is filled from 
the dugouts to the nosebleeds.  After eight years, baseball in Washington has finally taken 
off, and people commute from all over the District and its suburbs to watch Washington’s 
only winning professional sports team play.  Fans pack into the ballpark like sardines in a 
can, cheering for unlucky Teddy in the Presidents’ Race during the fourth inning, and 
eating chilidogs from Ben’s Chili Bowl, a local institution with a concessions booth at the 
stadium.  From my view high up in the cheap seats, the whole city unfolds before me.  
The Capitol building is ablaze as the hazy sunset illuminates it with a pinkish glow, and 
behind the stadium’s scoreboard, construction cranes rest above the open pits being 
transformed from factories to upscale commercial and real estate venues.  A great blue 
heron flies over the stadium, a reminder of the Anacostia River that’s just steps from 
Nationals Park.  The bird’s wings shimmer in the stadium lighting as it flies upriver.   
Down on the field, the Washington Nationals lead the Philadelphia Phillies.  Left 
fielder Michael Morse hits a grand slam and the Nats score another three runs.  The 
crowd roars and jumps to its feet—strangers and friends hug and high five, and serious 
fans make marks in their scorecards.  An intense energy surges throughout the stadium as 
spectators from across the city and its suburbs come together in the excitement of an 
impressive hit, a winning season, and the rebirth of baseball in the nation’s capital.  
The game ends and the Nats pull through with another victory.  Fans funnel 
quickly out of the stadium, heading below ground to the parking lots and the Navy Yard 
Metro stop.  Some spectators mill about on Half Street, buying discounted t-shirts and 
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baseball caps from the vendors who hawk unofficial merchandise outside the stadium 
grounds.  Most people, however, are focused on getting home; for the reality is that the 
majority of the game’s spectators don’t live in the neighborhood.  During home games, 
Near Southeast swarms with fans making their way to the stadium, but when the ballpark 
closes, the neighborhood is more or less untraveled by anyone apart from its residents.  In 
2004, city officials picked the site for Nationals Park as a means to revitalize Near 
Southeast and reconnect it to the rest of the city.  Unlike previous redevelopment 
attempts, contemporary plans for the neighborhood are marketed for their sustainable 
design and livability.  These recent plans embody the kind of environmental 
gentrification that Checker studied in Harlem, in which modern narratives of 
sustainability gloss over redevelopment’s realities of displacement and community 
disruption.  Yet while city officials touted the Anacostia waterfront as the District’s last 
frontier and inspired a flurry of redevelopment plans around the stadium, only a handful 
of those projects have been completed at the time of this writing, and the neighborhood 
still attracts few visitors outside of baseball season.  
Despite the slow start of current redevelopment plans for the Near Southeast 
waterfront, city officials continue to use the Anacostia River as a selling point to 
commercial and real estate investors.  The District’s re-envisioning of the Near Southeast 
waterfront is best demonstrated through the plans for The Yards development, a public-
private partnership to reclaim and redesign forty-two acres of formerly industrial land.  
Since the Navy Yard closed its plants and other factories withdrew from the waterfront, 
the neighborhood has limped through several revitalization attempts, some of which were 
more realistic than others.  The following chapter will examine the contemporary period 
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of redevelopment in Near Southeast, beginning with the siting of Nationals Park in 2004 
and continuing ongoing construction in 2013.  The redevelopment plans circulating at the 
time of this writing show an increased interest in environmental sensitivity; however, the 
plans ultimately threaten the resiliency of Near Southeast, as they envision the presence 
of a much wealthier community than currently resides there.  
Redevelopment is in no way a new phenomenon for this neighborhood, and since 
the close of World War II, the city has undertaken several efforts to redevelop Near 
Southeast.  During the 1950s, these efforts were focused on highway construction as a 
development tool that would increase access to the neighborhood by linking it to the 
suburbs and the rest of the city.  However, as Chapter Three discussed, highway 
construction proved to be an ineffective redevelopment measure, and the highways that 
cut through minority neighborhoods furthered social and environmental inequalities by 
restricting neighborhood access and increasing the presence of pollutants in both the air 
and storm water runoff.  The completion of the South Capitol and 11th Street Bridges and 
the Southeast Freeway’s slice through Near Southeast demonstrated that the modern 
infrastructure, marketed as a connecting tool to the broader city and suburbs, actually did 
the opposite.  Instead it carved up the neighborhood and left it broken and isolated.  After 
the new bridges and highways failed to increase investment in Near Southeast, 
redevelopers turned their focus to recreation as another revitalization tool.   
The National Capitol Planning Commission (NCPC), established in its current 
capacity by an act of Congress in 1952, was responsible for designing and enacting many 
of the recreation-based redevelopment plans that followed failed attempts of highway-
focused redevelopment.  The NCPC was a federal agency with virtually complete control 
	   87	  
over the District’s planning, so that new plans came out of a federal—not community—
vision for the city.  Congress didn’t grant the District home-rule until 1973, and, until that 
year, city governance and planning was entirely overseen by federal agencies like the 
NCPC.  Additionally, huge tracts of federal land further complicated city planning in 
Washington by limiting residential expansion and focusing planning efforts around the 
city’s monuments and tourist attractions.  Williams writes, “Washington is somewhat 
unique in the United States as a place where the state lies massively on the land.  Its 
citizens experience state formation keenly in their everyday lives, their access to natural 
resources, and their claims to citizenship.”237  For much of the twentieth century, the 
NCPC, as an arm of the state, sought to shape the way citizens interacted with the Near 
Southeast waterfront. 
The NCPC’s first major plan was released in 1961 and, in a shift away from the 
region’s history of industrialization, re-imagined the Southeast waterfront as a 
recreational space.  By that time, the Anacostia’s Near Southeast waterfront was a messy 
tangle of industrial facilities and abandoned factories.  Wennersten writes, “Neither the 
federal government nor the District had ever established zoning controls over the 
waterfront, which had become a mélange of piers, channel markers, semi-discarded 
industrial sites, and sewage outlets.”238  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s and into the 
1990s, the National Capital Planning Commission released a series of unrealized 
redevelopment plans for the Near Southeast waterfront that centered on the creation of 
large public parks.  In a 1997 report, the NCPC wrote that their new plans for the 	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waterfront sought to “recapture [Pierre L’Enfant’s] earlier vision and…offer Washington 
residents the same intimate connection to their rivers as Londoners and Parisians 
enjoy.”239  However, the Anacostia’s serious pollution, left over from years of 
unmitigated waterfront industrialization, made the river and its waterfront an extremely 
unappealing site for recreation.  The NCPC was never able to convince developers and 
the federal government to support its plans to create recreational space along a river the 
city had left for dead long before the 1960s, and none of these recreation-based 
redevelopment plans were ever enacted.  As scholar Paul L. Knox writes of the NCPC, 
“[I]t proved extremely insensitive to the needs of the District’s residents and almost 
totally incapable of any kind of strategic approach to urban development.”240  When the 
Anacostia’s pollution soured interest in river recreation, city officials finally turned to 
professional athletic stadiums as the key to the river’s redevelopment. 
 
Baseball Politics in the Nation’s Capital 
After decades of neglect, developers and city planners once again turned their 
attention to the Southeast waterfront’s large tracts of vacant land in the early 2000s.  The 
new plans for Near Southeast centered on the construction of a state-of-the-art baseball 
stadium for the city’s new team, the Washington Nationals.  The District began a bid to 
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bring Major League Baseball back to Washington in 2004 under Mayor Anthony 
Williams, and in 2005 the Montreal Expos moved to the District to become the 
Washington Nationals.  From the start, financial consideration drove the decision to bring 
baseball back to Washington.  The stadium construction plans sparked a debate on 
effective redevelopment when a group of city council members came out against 
William’s vision of Washington baseball.  Throughout the debate on city council, 
environmental concerns about the dangers of building on the Anacostia’s ecologically 
fragile waterfront were markedly absent, and economic worries over the use of public 
funds consistently trumped environmental issues.     
To developers and city officials, the Near Southeast waterfront was an appealing 
location for a new stadium as the neighborhood’s legacy of industrial activity had left 
unusually large tracts of vacated land that were ripe for redevelopment.  Although there 
was more vacant land along the Southeast waterfront than in other parts of the District, in 
2004 Near Southeast also supported a community of minority and low-income residents 
as well as businesses ranging from industry, art, and entertainment.  In 2000, census data 
reported that residents in Near Southeast were 89% African American and earned a 
median household income of $15,071.241  Most of these residents lived west of the river, 
while industry remained congregated along the waterfront.  When the city selected Near 
Southeast as the site for the new baseball stadium in 2004, the waterfront was home to 
several industrial complexes including an asphalt plant and the Eastern Trans-Waste trash 
transfer station, as well as a number of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer 
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(LGBTQ) bars and nightclubs.  For over ten years, LGBTQ nightlife in the District had 
found a home in this small pocket of waterfront land in a forgotten neighborhood.  
According to the Washington City Paper, drag queen bars like Ziegfeld’s and gay strip 
clubs like Secrets made up “a thriving gay nightlife scene in what was then a distant 
corner of the city where club owners could do their business blissfully free of the usual 
quarrels with neighbors who might protest booze and debauchery.”242  With land seizures 
and increased property values, redevelopment of Near Southeast threatened to displace a 
marginalized and diverse community that had found a home there.  City officials sought 
to redefine Near Southeast’s community identity when stadium construction inspired a 
new neighborhood vision that centered on waterfront access and livability. 
Site selection for the stadium, however, was only first step in a long process of 
neighborhood redevelopment, and progress proceeded haltingly.  By far the biggest 
roadblock in the way of stadium construction was Washington’s City Council.  Major 
League Baseball (MLB) would not approve the Montreal Expos’ move to the District as 
the Washington Nationals unless the city could prove that it would provide a stadium for 
the team.  The Washington Post reported, “The stadium would be funded through a gross 
receipts tax on large businesses, a tax on concessions and an annual rent payment by the 
team.”243  The Williams administration designed the plan for the new stadium so that it 
would be publicly funded without directly affecting taxpaying citizens, hoping that this 
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would smooth its approval process through City Council.  Under the Williams plan, 
private businesses would bear the brunt of the burden to raise funds for the stadium.  
MLB is traditionally friendlier to publicly funded stadium plans, as their construction 
tends to be less volatile than privately funded plans that rely heavily on investor 
commitment and economic stability.	  244  However, a vocal contingent of council members 
objected to the idea of spending public funds on a baseball stadium at the expense of 
social services.  	  
Although the Williams plan called for an increased tax on big business, not 
citizens, council members such as future mayor Adrian Fenty (Democrat, Ward 4) 
objected to the use of tax money for a project that he did not see as providing a direct 
community benefit.  Council Chairman Linda Cropp (Democrat, At-large) and David 
Catania (Independent, At-large) were two of the most active council members to join 
Fenty in opposition to public funding.  Mayor Williams anticipated opposition to a 
publicly funded stadium, and included efforts to provide economic support for social 
services in his plan.  According to the Washington Post, the Mayor’s plan “would 
establish a special district in neighborhoods around the stadium in which taxes from 
businesses would be designated to pay for bonds that could bring as much as $450 
million for community programs.”245	  	  Despite the creation of community investment 
funds, some council members continued to question the necessity of using tax money for 
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stadium construction.  In an online discussion hosted by the Washington Post, Fenty 
explained the dissenters’ position,  
The consistency among those who opposed the proposal was that we did 
not think that the Council should float a $550 million bond, paid for with 
increased taxes, to build a stadium which would directly enrich owners of 
the Montreal Expos (the 29 owners of MLB), who could very clearly 
afford to pay for this themselves.246 
 
While Mayor Williams argued that the new stadium would provide concrete benefits 
through job creation and neighborhood revitalization, a vocal contingent on the City 
Council continued to argue that the stadium’s benefits were too indirect to merit the use 
of public funds.  Council Chairman Linda Cropp made the search for private funding a 
priority, and at one point she delayed a vote so that she could solidify a plan with a 
private investor that was ultimately unsuccessful.   
Throughout the approval process, Fenty consistently expressed his view that the 
use of public funds for stadium construction set a dangerous precedent in which the city 
gambled public money on a risky redevelopment project, rather than spending it on 
concrete social services, such as schools and libraries.  As Fenty said in the Washington 
Post online discussion, “[I]n my opinion, new tax dollars should go to higher priorities” 
than baseball stadiums.247  Throughout the debate, Fenty emphasized the fact that 
Washington already had a standing stadium for the team to use: the Robert F. Kennedy 
Memorial Stadium (RFK), that was built further upriver along the Anacostia’s Southeast 
waterfront for the Washington Redskins football team and the District’s previous baseball 
team, the Washington Senators, in 1961.  Summarizing his position on Washington 
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baseball, Fenty wrote, “I support 1) renovating RFK and having the team play there or 2) 
a deal similar to the MCI [Center] deal where the owner of the team paid for the stadium 
and we [the city] paid for the infrastructure around the stadium.”248	  	  The MCI Center 
(now Verizon Center) in the Penn Quarter neighborhood of Northwest Washington 
provided an excellent example of a privately funded stadium that set off the significant 
redevelopment of an urban neighborhood.  Fenty was vocal in his support of a private 
funding plan, like the MCI Center, that would prevent the city from selling bonds and 
raising taxes to finance a new stadium.  If the District raised taxes on large businesses, 
Fenty believed this money should fund direct community investment projects, not 
stadium construction.    	  
 The debate over stadium funding within City Council set off a contentious, 
District-wide discussion over stadium construction and redevelopment.  Washington Post 
Sports writer Thomas Boswell used his platform as a columnist to advocate for a publicly 
funded stadium, using language that was echoed by many baseball supporters across the 
city, including Mayor Williams and City Council member Jack Evans (Democrat, Ward 
2).  In December 2004, Boswell wrote, “The Council claims to be fighting for the poor of 
the District when it is far more likely that it is in the process of killing a development 
deal, with baseball as its centerpiece, that would bring significant benefits, not costs, to 
those very constituents.”249  Where Fenty saw urban stadium construction as a risky 
redevelopment tool, Boswell saw it as unfailing.  Noting that both Cropp and Fenty were 
anticipating mayoral campaigns, Boswell interpreted their opposition as nothing more 	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than political posturing.  “They prefer to round up cheap votes for themselves by bashing 
baseball rather than bringing a team back to Washington, bringing urban development to 
a blighted area and adding millions of dollars to the city’s tax base,” Boswell wrote.250  A 
common refrain among baseball supporters was the notion that Nationals fans would 
travel into the District and spend their money at the stadium and other District businesses, 
rather than keeping their money in the suburbs.	  251	  	  Boswell argued, “more than 80 
percent of Nationals fans, about two million a year, would come from the suburbs and 
spend tens of millions of discretionary entertainment dollars in the District.”252  For the 
new stadium’s supporters, this increased visitation by suburbanites represented the most 
significant economic argument for building a new ballpark in the District, yet this focus 
had important environmental implications.  By grounding redevelopment in a project that 
explicitly catered to suburban residents, the District not only encouraged increased 
automobile traffic and a subsequent rise in toxic vehicle emissions, but also constructed 
more impervious surfaces, such as parking lots, to accommodate suburban consumers.  
After months of intense debate, a close seven to six vote in City Council finally 
approved a revised version of the Mayor’s plan that included compromises that somewhat 
lessened the amount of public funding needed to build Nationals Park.  Cropp, an 
opponent of Williams’ initial plan, eventually voted to approve public funding after 
several attempts to redesign the plan and a series of closed-door meetings with the mayor.  
Fenty and Catania voted in opposition of every version of the public funding plan set 
before the City Council.  According to the Washington Post, the revised bill that 
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eventually passed through City Council authorized the use of public funds for stadium 
construction and included “changes [that] could reduce the District’s potential costs for 
the stadium by up to $193.5 million when compared with the deal Williams struck with 
baseball officials in September [2004].”253  However, Cropp’s negotiation to reduce 
stadium costs sacrificed the community investment mechanisms that Williams had 
included in his initial plan.	  254  In early December 2004, the Washington Post reported 
that funds for District services, including $45 million for libraries, $30 million for 
community investment projects, and the possibility of $450 in bonds for “neighborhood 
needs,” had been taken out of the deal in order to lessen economic pressure on the 
businesses paying higher gross receipt taxes to finance stadium construction.	  255 	  With 
fewer opportunities for community investment, the new plan was hardly encouraging for 
opponents like Fenty.  Nevertheless, the plan made it through City Council by one vote, 
and the city faced the second hurdle of clearing the way for stadium construction.     
	  
Figure	  12:	  A	  view	  of	  the	  completed	  Nationals	  Park	  from	  the	  Anacostia	  River,	  n.d.	  	  Source:	  
http://www.baseballpilgrimages.com/national/anacostiaview.jpg.	   
The city used eminent domain laws to consolidate land for the Nationals Park, but 
it faced considerable opposition from the landowners it tried to buy out.  Twenty-three 	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separate landowners occupied the twenty-one-acre waterfront stadium site between South 
Capitol Street and First Street.  Just as the federal government’s expansion of the Navy 
Yard through eminent domain caused controversy in Near Southeast during the 1940s, 
the District government’s use of eminent domain to build Nationals Park set off a series 
of lawsuits from neighborhood businesses.  Beginning in April 2005, the city used a $97-
million-dollar fund to make offers to the landowners for over twice the land’s 2004 tax 
value.256 257  While some owners accepted the District’s offers, the Washington Times 
reported, “Many property owners on the site said the city’s offers are inadequate.  Others 
are suing the city on the grounds that it has no right to use eminent domain to acquire 
land at the site, despite a Supreme Court ruling affirming the right of municipal 
governments to take private property for the purpose of economic development.”258  The 
city believed that the stadium would begin a process of redevelopment in the area, and 
therefore warranted the use of eminent domain laws to seize land for its construction.  
However, the plaintiffs in these eminent domain cases against the District questioned the 
legitimacy of stadium building as a redevelopment tool by arguing that a stadium would 
serve to enrich private owners, not the community.   
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Figure	  13:	  An	  aerial	  picture	  of	  Nationals	  Park,	  with	  the	  Anacostia	  River	  and	  South	  Capitol	  Street	  Bridge	  
in	  the	  background,	  2009.	  	  Source:	  http://www.mnn.com/money/green-­workplace/stories/fields-­of-­
green.	   
Particularly affected by the District’s use of eminent domain were the many bars, 
nightclubs, and other businesses oriented towards Washington’s LGBTQ community that 
had established a niche along the Near Southeast waterfront.  The Washington City Paper 
wrote that stadium land pushed out many of these establishments, including an arcade 
and theater, dubbed “The Glory Hole,” that had been in the neighborhood since 1980.259  
While a few of these nightclubs managed to stay in the area, most were closed and 
displaced by the stadium’s construction.  City Council made some effort to help these 
businesses reopen in a new location, however, most were unable to meet the new 
standards and regulations included in the legislation, and they remained closed despite 
the city’s help.260   
The District also seized industrial facilities to make way for the new stadium. 
While most of the LGBTQ establishments accepted the city’s offers without a fight in 
court, several of the industries operating on the stadium site chose to sue the District for 
higher compensation and better relocation assistance.  Eastern Trans-Waste was one of 
the companies that sued the District after it offered $8.7 million for the land occupied by 	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the company’s trash transfer facility. 261  The Washington Post reported, “Company 
officials have said in a letter to the District that they expect a sale price of $14.3 million 
for the property, plus $18 million if the firm is forced out of business.”262  Southeast Land 
Development Associates also sued the District for “improperly taking the land” it rented 
to the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority as a bus parking lot.263  In their suit, 
the company argued, “The city ‘has failed to determine and pay just compensation for the 
Property,’ and thus has no legal right to take the land under terms of the council’s 
financing legislation.”264  Although companies like Eastern Trans-Waste and Southeast 
Land Development Associates challenged the legality of the District’s use of eminent 
domain, the courts upheld the city’s belief that the baseball stadium was a legitimate form 
of economic development, and the cases were settled by 2009.265 
 
Sport Stadiums and Environmental Justice 
In the District, Boswell and Fenty were the archetype of each side of the tired 
debate over publicly funded stadiums that engulfed cities from Phoenix to Brooklyn as 
they attempted to revive their downtowns by building professional sporting arenas.  The 
use of stadiums as a redevelopment tool had risen to prominence through the end of the 
20th century and by the 1990s scholars were very critical of its effectiveness.  Just as 	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residents and City Council members debated the siting and funding of Nationals Park in 
Near Southeast, constituents and local politicians in Brooklyn, New York, participated in 
a similar debate over the construction of a new stadium for the New Jersey Nets, who 
moved to Brooklyn to become the Brooklyn Nets in 2012.  Like Nationals Park, the 
Barclays Center, which was completed in 2012, was intended to jumpstart development 
of commercial and real estate venues in the surrounding areas on Atlantic and Flatbush 
Avenues.  The Barclays Center represents yet another attempt to reclaim industrial space 
through redevelopment, as it was built overlooking one of Brooklyn’s rail yards.     
Scholar Julie Sze has exposed environmental justice dimensions of the 
redevelopment plans that piggybacked off of the Barclays Center’s construction.  Sze 
notes that, in Brooklyn, the opportunities for jobs, recreation, and better housing were 
continually touted as social benefits for stadium-driven redevelopment.266  In cities like 
Brooklyn or Washington, D.C., local politicians and developers often present stadium 
construction as a way out from the history of industrialization that resulted in the decline 
of urban waterfront neighborhoods.267  However, Sze argues that the economic and 
political role of urban stadiums is actually much more complex.  She writes,  
in one sense, stadiums, recreational facilities, and open space represent the 
seeming “reflection” or opposite to the polluting facilities that have been 
the focus of the vast majority of environmental justice research that 
addresses harms, specifically racial disparities in exposure to noxious 
facilities…[T]he development and siting of so-called positive amenities 
follows a similar cultural and political trajectory as that of noxious 
facilities.268    
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Today stadiums are sited in the same low-income and minority neighborhoods where 
factories and industrial facilities historically operated.  Stadium siting in downtowns 
offers as a useful tool for cities hoping to jumpstart the area’s redevelopment, however 
studies like Sze’s have shown that stadium construction transforms a neighborhood from 
a place where people live, work, and play into a tourist destination.   
Describing the dependence on stadium construction for redevelopment, scholar 
Kent A. Robertson applies the notion of a “‘special activity generator’” (SAG) where 
prospects for economic revitalization are completely dependent on one initial 
investment.269  In this model, developments such as stadiums or convention centers are 
expected to “anchor redevelopment within that district by drawing visitors and 
suburbanites to downtown for events.”270  New, often single-use, facilities attract 
consumers to formerly isolated regions, bringing new consumer dollars to existing 
establishments and inspiring the opening of new ones as well.271  “In addition,” urban 
planner Timothy S. Chapin adds, “these projects often galvanize other investments in the 
district by the public sector, perhaps in the form of new infrastructure or urban design 
improvements, all of which help to establish and sustain a revitalized district.”272  This 
last step is the most important part of the SAG model.  If the initial investment in a new 
large facility fails to inspire further investment in the surrounding area, the SAG model 
will not lead to redevelopment.   	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As a redevelopment tool, construction of stadiums under the SAG model is not 
only risky but also problematic in that it recreates neighborhoods as tourist destinations, 
rather than financially and socially stable communities.  Dependent on sports seasons, the 
popularity of sports teams, and overall consumer choices, sports stadiums hardly provide 
a stable economic grounding for a community.  As scholars Robert F. Baade and Richard 
F. Dye argue, “Professional sports are just one kind of entertainment activity and as such 
compete for the local consumer’s scarce disposable income and leisure time.”273  The 
sports industry is similar to the tourist industry in that it depends heavily on consumer 
spending.  In regards to sports marketing and development, Sze summarizes, “the politics 
of development pivot around this question: ‘Is the city a product to be sold on the tour. . . 
or as a location in which to invest money?  Or, is it a community where people— 
including those without much disposable income—can live, work, play and belong? 
[italics added].’”274  The definition of the city as a product, rather than an ecological 
body, results in weak redevelopment that does little to improve community resiliency.  
The Camden Yards stadium for MLB baseball’s Baltimore Orioles in downtown 
Baltimore followed the SAG model and inspired the development of a booming tourist 
industry in the nearby Inner Harbor.  Because of its links to a new tourist industry, 
Camden Yards has been promoted as the poster child for successful SAG redevelopment.  
Chapin studies the validity of these claims by using a “‘but for’” test in which he 
examines the dependence of new developments on publicly funded stadium 
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construction.275  Although Camden Yards has widely been touted as a success, Chapin 
determined that the redevelopment it inspired is actually quite limited.  Downtown 
Baltimore’s western adjacent edge to the stadium has seen little new development since 
Camden Yards was completed in 1992.  What development that has occurred has mostly 
taken form as additions or renovations to existing complexes, such as the University of 
Maryland at Baltimore or the Baltimore Convention Center.276   Housing development 
has been almost nonexistent, and Chapin notes, “the area did not experience an influx of 
housing in new or renovated spaces in the area, despite the trend towards downtown 
housing in the United States throughout the 1990s.”277  East of the stadium, Baltimore’s 
downtown has seen the construction of new office buildings and a major entertainment 
development, with some support from public funds.278  However, Chapin writes, 
“Somewhat perversely, instead of new development being catalyzed in the immediate 
district, areas surrounding Camden Yards have seen the opposite: clearing of land for 
surface parking lots.”279  The baseball games at Camden Yards certainly succeeded in 
attracting suburbanites back to downtown Baltimore, however, accommodation for these 
visitors came at the expense of meaningful redevelopment for urban residents.  Moreover, 
the construction of parking lots and other impervious surfaces exacerbated the 
environmental problem of storm water runoff into the nearby Inner Harbor.  Chapin 
determined that the overall lack of direct stadium-driven redevelopment around Camden 
Yards is the result of the conflicting needs of the city and the professional sports teams.  
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While city planners hope to develop the current parking lots into an entertainment 
district, the Orioles need the parking lots to accommodate their fan base during home 
games.280  Because Baltimore’s downtown redevelopment hinges on the success of 
Camden Yards, further redevelopment plans have been sacrificed for the benefit of the 
stadium and its franchise.  Camden Yards exemplifies the inequalities implicit within 
stadium-driven redevelopment plans, which place community benefits second to 
commercial success.        
Stadiums not only provide unreliable redevelopment plans, but they also are a 
weak community resource.  As they are usually built in low-income communities, 
stadiums are generally inaccessible to the surrounding community members who lack the 
disposable income to spend on tickets for games and events.  Nevertheless, cities like 
Baltimore and Brooklyn justified public funding for professional sports arenas the 
presumed benefits of redevelopment and the temporary and permanent jobs provided by 
the stadiums’ construction and operation.281  Besides temporary construction positions, 
stadiums mostly offer “dead-end” jobs for janitors, parking attendants, and concessions 
or food service workers. 282  These jobs were not much better than those at the industrial 
plants that formerly occupied Camden Yards and the Navy Yard.  With few opportunities 
for upward mobility, and seasonal bouts of unemployment, stadium jobs provide only a 
partial respite from economic burdens.  Stadium construction in low-income and minority 
communities often furthers inequalities by catering to suburban economic elites at the 
expense of economically disadvantaged urban residents.    
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 ‘Green’ Redevelopment and Community Resiliency 
The District also pursued the ambitious achievement of building the nation’s first 
LEED certified baseball stadium.  The city pursued LEED certification not only to help 
reframe Washington as a leader of sustainability in the built environment but also to 
respond to environmental concerns about waterfront development.  Throughout the 
construction process, the District struggled to balance environmental sensitivity with 
economic feasibility, however the stadium eventually earned a Silver rating.  The stadium 
includes sustainable design features such as a green roof, recycled building materials, 
storm water filtration systems, and low-use light lighting. 283 284  While the U.S. Green 
Building Council awarded the ballpark LEED points for building on a brownfield, the 
city spent considerably more on environmental remediation than it had anticipated.  
According to the Washington Times, the city paid $1.012 million for LEED certification 
alone, and spent much more on expensive brownfield remediation procedures.285  
Although the city ended up paying more for land costs and clean up than it expected, its 
LEED certification gave the stadium significant media attention that applauded the 
District’s achievement and pressured other cities to follow Washington’s lead in future 
developments.      
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Nationals Park’s achievement of becoming the nation’s first LEED certified 
ballpark also inspired a trend of ‘green’ redevelopment around the stadium that focused 
on creating modern urban waterfront communities.  Many District government and 
private companies favor mixed-use complexes to facilitate the creation of livable 
communities in which residents can walk or take public transportation to access their 
work as well as recreation, entertainment, and commercial venues.  As they did in 
Nationals Park, developers reclaimed brownfields throughout the neighborhood, building 
on formerly industrial sites that were reappropriated to make way for waterfront 
apartments and commercial establishments.  The largest of these land parcels is The 
Yards, a high-end, mixed-use development just one block east of Nationals Park.  In total, 
the development stretches through four city blocks, and occupies forty-two acres of 
waterfront land that once hosted the Naval Gun Factory and later the GSA’s Southeast 
Federal Center complex.  The project represents an ambitious effort at redevelopment, 
incorporating commercial, real estate, and business ventures to create a new kind of 
livable and sustainable urban community.   
	  
Figure	  14:	  An	  architect's	  rendering	  of	  the	  plan	  for	  The	  Yards	  development,	  2013.	  	  Source:	  
http://www.dcyards.com/gallery/photos/.	   
	   106	  
At the time of this writing, The Yards is expected to cost $1.5 billion financed by 
a public-private partnership between the District Office of the Deputy Mayor for 
Planning and Economic Development, the federal government’s General Services 
Administration, and a private real estate firm, Forest City Enterprises.286  Forest City, 
notably, is the same real estate firm responsible for designing and executing a similar 
public-private redevelopment project, the Atlantic Yards, adjacent to Brooklyn’s new 
Barclays Center.  As was the case in the Atlantic Yards project, the District’s partnership 
with Forest City attempts to merge community and commercial investment. 
Collaborating with the local and federal government, Forest City Washington has 
committed to a number of community investment initiatives.  First, they have fronted $1 
million for pre-apprenticeship initiatives that would train District residents in 
construction jobs.  (Forest City promised a similar program to Brooklyn residents, 
however they failed to come through with the initiative and are now being sued by a local 
non-profit, Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development.)287  Secondly, although 
The Yards are aimed at a higher income bracket than that which currently resides in Near 
Southeast, Forest City has agreed to keep twenty percent of the residential rental units in 
The Yards development “affordable to families earning up to 50 percent of Area Median 
Income.”288  Lastly, Forest City has made a commitment to integrate public space into the 
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Yards complex.  According to the District’s Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and 
Economic Development, the firm has promised to build the city a 5.5 acre “[w]orld-
class” park and marina along the Anacostia waterfront.289  With these investments, the 
District hopes the Yards will catalyze a major redevelopment trend within the Near 
Southeast community.  Indeed, the city government anticipates that the project will more 
than pay back its development costs by generating $1.6 billion of private reinvestment 
money in Southeast Washington.290    
The District touts The Yards development as a kind of model for its new vision of 
the nation’s capital as a leader in urban sustainability.  According to the Office of the 
Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development’s webpage, The Yards “is [the] 
key piece of the city’s 30-year effort to reclaim and rebuild the Anacostia Waterfront.”291  
In July 2011, Mayor Vincent C. Grey released his initial Sustainable DC plan in which he 
outlined a list of achievements he plans for the city to accomplish by 2032.  Central to 
these achievements was the restoration of the Anacostia River.  By February 2013, the 
Mayor released a final version of the plan, Sustainability DC, that focused on the 
concrete actions the city would take to “make the District the healthiest, greenest, and 
most livable city in the nation.”292  Mayor Grey’s plan is divided into “Challenges” (Jobs 
and the Economy, Health and Wellness, Equity and Diversity, and Climate and the 
Environment) and “Solutions” (Built Environment, Energy, Food, Nature, 
Transportation, Waste, and Water).  These chapters put ecological restoration and 	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environmental sensitivity at the forefront of the District’s future planning. 
Besides the community investment measures incorporated into the development 
plan, the design of The Yards complex is also significant.  The Mayor’s Sustainability 
DC plan suggests that the District should “[r]equire new waterfront developments and 
renovations to incorporate Low Impact Development strategies.”293  These strategies are 
to be determined through new legislation that would link zoning approvals with the 
provision of “green infrastructure and stormwater management that protect and enhance 
river ecosystems by using native plant species to regenerate habitats for local wildlife, 
fish, and birds.”294  Through new legislation, the District hopes to encourage the rise of 
sustainable waterfront communities that focus on environmental sensitivity in both their 
construction and operation. 
The Yards provide an excellent example of the District’s recent approach to 
sustainable development, as many of its new environmentally sensitive strategies are 
incorporated into its design.  The completed projects in the development have already 
showcased a commitment to sustainable design, and include features such as bioretention 
planters inset into the sidewalks that divert runoff into rain gardens, rather than storm 
drains, as well as native plant landscaping in the Yards Park.295  Additionally, the Office 
of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development states that The Yards 
“will be built to the highest green design standards,” however, neither the District nor 
Forest City elaborate in their publications on what those standards actually entail.296  The 
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projects completed at the time of this writing are residential, commercial, and 
recreational, and include the Yards Park, Foundry Lofts, the Boilmaker Shop, and the 
Park Pavilions, and several of these have won awards for their adaptive reuse designs of 
the Navy Yard’s historic buildings, as well as the modern interpretation and incorporation 
of historical architectural details.  However, there is a significant lack of information 
about the concrete sustainable design features of both the completed and future projects 
at The Yards.  While the District and Forest City have yet to publicize their concrete 
plans for The Yards’ sustainable design, it is nevertheless significant that both entities 
have made a commitment to creating development as an ecologically sensitive built 
environment. 
	  
Figure	  15:	  The	  completed	  Yards	  Park,	  2013.	  	  Photo	  by	  author.	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Figure	  16:	  A	  bioretention	  planter	  and	  bike	  racks	  outside	  Yards	  Park	  on	  Water	  Street,	  SE,	  2013.	  	  Photo	  by	  
author.	  
In The Yards project, the District government, the federal government, and Forest 
City are concerned with economic profitability, but the District in particular also views 
the projects as the cornerstone of its contemporary effort to redevelop Near Southeast.  
The development represents a contemporary rethinking of the waterfront region that links 
modern living to a historical past.  The Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and 
Economic Development writes, “[T]he Yards will offer Washingtonians an eclectic and 
authentic urban waterfront neighborhood.”297   However, urban studies scholars have 
repeatedly questioned this notion of authenticity in publicly funded redevelopment 
projects.  As Hagerman writes of redevelopment in Portland, Oregon, “New visions 
incorporate particular memories and not others, articulate social exclusions, and recast 
places within new forms of cultural capital.”298  The federal and local governments’ 
involvement in selecting certain historical narratives to include in redevelopment 	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projects, such as The Yards, represents a problematic government action through which 
community narratives are subverted in exchange for state-sponsored memories.  	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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the District emphasizes The Yards’ commitment to community history, the 
public and private entities framing Near Southeast’s redevelopment have consciously 
chosen a specific historical moment in the neighborhood’s timeline with which to connect 
its redevelopment.  This selective decision has placed certain historical narratives above 
others, so that The Yards emphasizes the Navy Yard’s patriotic production but ignores 
the social and environmental justice issues of land displacement, poor wage payment, and 
environmental contamination. As historian Andrew Hurley writes in his discussion of the 
St. Louis waterfront’s redevelopment, “[T]he danger of reducing history to uncritical 
celebration lurks wherever manufacturing local pride constitutes a project goal.”299  
Promoting The Yards as the centerpiece of its vision for a new Washington where once 
derelict waterfronts are redeveloped into livable communities along a restored river, the 
District government certainly seeks to instill local pride through redevelopment.  
However, the history with which The Yards espouses itself is an incredibly thorny 
period of time when capitalism and military industrialism dominated the waterfront.  The 
project’s website features an interactive timeline that promotes future developments 
while offering “a historical look at how The Yards came to be.”300  The timeline 
references the early commodores at the Navy Yard and its expansion with the annex 
where The Yards is located today.  Connecting the project to the U.S. Navy’s heyday as a 
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power “‘Second to None’ in the world,” the developers glorify this period of military 
industrialism.  On the project’s webpage, the developers describe The Yard’s location in 
Near Southeast as “a place of proud industrial and nautical heritage,” thereby obscuring 
the negative social and environmental impact that waterfront military and industrial 
operations had on the neighborhood.301  Redesigning “noble industrial building[s]” into 
high-end residential lofts and machinery shops into trendy restaurants and breweries, the 
Forest City architects reappropriate this complicated period of history as golden age. 302  
This project is, in a sense, rewriting history more than it is reclaiming it by telling only 
one side of the historical narrative.    
The Near Southeast waterfront has been continually shaped and reshaped by 
dominant forces of power such as the U.S. Navy, the federal government, and capitalism.  
Through The Yards development, the public and private economic interests are working 
together to once again repurpose the waterfront.  Although the developers are in no 
means incorporating a holistic public history into their redevelopment plan, it is notable 
that they are incorporating any public history at all.  The project’s historical timeline 
does, for example, make references to Near Southeast’s legacy of diversity as “a 
neighborhood of hard-working skilled African-American and Eastern European 
families,” and hints at their complex relationship with local industry by mentioning the 
Navy Yard’s expansion during the 1940s that seized “some of the homes formerly 
occupied by Navy Yard laborers.”303  Though veiled, these references to the 
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neighborhood’s historical depth leave some room for a more critical reclamation of 
history on the part of the developers.  As Hurley writes,   
Even when executed imperfectly, aligning narratives with the experiences 
of ordinary urban inhabitants and their specific community agendas holds 
tremendous promise for…connecting people of diverse backgrounds more 
firmly to the urban landscape, bringing a greater sense of social unity to a 
fragmented metropolis, and restoring the vitality of America’s 
metropolitan cores.304 
 
The Yards’ incorporation of history into its promotional material and actual design plans 
represents a small step towards a more just community narrative.  The developers, 
nevertheless, must take a more inclusive approach to the neighborhood’s public history if 
they wish to create a more equitable development.  As Hurley writes, “A messier past 
may turn out to be a more usable one if it provides more residents of the multicultural 
metropolis with an understanding of how they arrived at their present situation and where 
they might choose to go in the future.”305  In their online description of the project, the 
developers limit the accessibility of The Yards by grounding their historical frame of 
reference in a narrow selection of the many social and ecological processes that created 
Near Southeast.   
The Yards’ plans only capture a small slice of the neighborhood’s long history of 
industrialization, militarization, social inequality, and ecological destruction.  In order to 
equitably represent the neighborhood’s history and future in its re-envisioning of Near 
Southeast, the District government, the federal government, and Forest City must include 
a more holistic public narrative that recognizes the military and industry’s positive and 
negative impacts on the neighborhood, as well as the community histories of the Eastern 
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European and African American populations who have called Near Southeast home.  
With its recent redevelopment, the neighborhood has the opportunity to be at the 
forefront of redefining the significance of modern urban waterfronts, however the success 
of this process depends on the amount of community input.  Whereas previous top-down 
redevelopment plans failed to create equitable communities in Near Southeast, the public 
and private partnership behind The Yards has the potential to rebuild a marginalized 
landscape into a model of urban livability as long as it includes a meaningful community 
discussion of place.  Although the developers of The Yards have made efforts to express 
redevelopment in the language of the neighborhood’s past, their selective historical 
narrative is potentially exclusionary to contemporary residents with little connection to 
the neighborhood’s naval history.  The District must be careful to include the pasts and 
present narratives of both the neighborhood’s environment and residents in its 
redevelopment of Near Southeast.   
Continually flowing through Washington’s inner city, the Anacostia River offers 
an entry point into these narratives.  On its currents, the river has carried the stories of 
colonial explorers, tobacco farmers, captains of industry, and military powers.  It has also 
carried the experiences of slaves, immigrants, factory workers, and fishermen.  Despite 
its long history of exploitation and environmental degradation, the Anacostia has 
persisted as a defining feature of many of the District’s waterfront communities.  Years 
of heavy industry and federal water management weakened the river’s ecosystem, but 
recent efforts at environmental remediation have helped it move towards ecological 
integrity.  In the river’s ongoing restoration is an example of the resiliency of urban 
environments.  Near Southeast has provided the landscape for social goals such as 
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military industrialism, postwar modernism, urban renewal, and sustainable 
redevelopment.  The Anacostia has remained a touchstone throughout Near Southeast’s 
changing identities as an urban space.  By linking new goals with the historical narratives 
that flow through the river’s waters, contemporary redevelopers can find authenticity in 
the story of the Anacostia River.             
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